Moreover now they have the ability to check directly the residential addresses from CRA from the tax filings. Can you please elaborate on the bolded please. Residency information that CRA share with IRCC is if the applicant filed as a resident or non-resident of Canada in a given tax year. And for the addresses record, CRA only show your current residential address and not the past ones.
TRIAGE 1 -What is it?
- Thread starter amk2015
- Start date
you are right buddy, this is all the info they get from CRA
"Residency information that CRA share with IRCC is if the applicant filed as a resident or non-resident of Canada in a given tax year. And for the addresses record, CRA only show your current residential address and not the past ones"
There can be a huge difference between what information is routinely shared between different government bodies versus what CAN BE and might be obtained regarding a specific individual through referrals and investigations based on specified grounds. Obviously, the upper limit of this is the use of full-blown warrants in criminal investigations, such as where IRCC identifies grounds to apprehend residency/presence fraud and makes a referral to the RCMP for a criminal investigation.
Privacy restrictions limit the extent to which information can be shared without cause. During the Harper government some of these privacy restrictions were trimmed pursuant to legislation explicitly expanding information sharing, particularly as between CBSA, CIC (now IRCC), CRA, and law enforcement.
The scope of what can be shared if there is CAUSE (grounds, reasons) ranges widely beyond what can be routinely shared. Cause trumps privacy to the extent of the government's articulated need for the information in a specific case. Again, the upper range in this is the full-blown, judicially issued criminal warrant, pursuant to which investigators can obtain in-depth access into an individual's government records. The "cause" must be particular to the individual, sufficient to justify the particular intrusion into the individual's privacy.
But the potential scope of this is, of course, huge, recognizing that if the government has sufficient reason the courts can issue warrants allowing a search of a person's home and the seizure of records and computer equipment and so on in the individual's home or office. Obviously, records held by other government bodies can likewise be the subject of a warrant. There is very little which is totally beyond the reach of a criminal investigation.
That end of the spectrum is a long, long way from routine inquiries conducted in the course of processing a citizenship application. This is NOT anything to have the slightest thought about, let alone worry about, for the qualified citizenship applicant who has provided truthful information.
But anyone who has submitted inconsistent information to different government bodies related to obtaining some government benefit (ranging from tax deductions to benefit payments, from credits to immigration or citizenship status) has reason to worry that one or other of the government bodies involved will identify reason to make further inquiries, conduct an investigation, and discover any false information submitted to one or the other government body. A lot of this, a lot of fraud, is done and not discovered. A lot of this that is done is discovered. The government provides secure housing, meals and bars on the windows are included, for the more egregious cases.
Address information generally:
In routine citizenship application processing there are many ways in which a processing agent can expand an inquiry to verify residential addresses provided by the applicant. Whether a processing agent does pursue any additional inquiry likely depends on whether something or the other triggers a question or concern. There are many indications that IRCC is increasingly accessing open source information, ranging from social media and Canada411, to online sites like LinkedIn, ordinary internet search engine queries, and it would be surprising if IRCC does not somewhat routinely at least glance at google maps, perhaps even in street view, to get an idea about some if not many declared addresses. Looking for incongruities.
Here too, the difference between what is routine versus what is done if IRCC has some suspicions about a particular applicant undoubtedly ranges widely. Routine: cursory look at applicant's information. Reason for suspicion: more in-depth review of information ranging up to a RCMP referral for investigation.
Additionally, it is now likely that GCMS records are kept for particular addresses, at least postal codes. We know for sure that there are GCMS records for some employers, those who have been identified as providing unreliable information in the past, or identified as associated with someone who has been involved in immigration, residency, or citizenship fraud. Thus, even in the routine application processing, a processing agent probably runs GCMS queries to see if there is a hit in the records against any address or employer declared by the applicant.
But again there are many approaches IRCC can take, and undoubtedly sometimes does take, to verify the applicant's address and employer information. Again, this undoubtedly ranges from cursory cross-checks for the vast majority of applicants, to intensely elevated scrutiny and even criminal investigations for those applicants who IRCC has suspicions regarding.
All this will be criteria-driven, fact-based, and rule governed. So it is not as if IRCC is at all likely to engage in unfounded fishing expeditions.
Apart from moral imperatives, there is a solid, practical reason for sticking to the truth in reporting information to the government: that is what works best most of the time. Those who do otherwise tend to get a stiff neck from always looking over their shoulders. Frankly, been there, done that, know the score, learned a lesson, paid the piper. Kind of like doubling down every hand playing black jack, sooner than later you go broke.
Privacy restrictions limit the extent to which information can be shared without cause. During the Harper government some of these privacy restrictions were trimmed pursuant to legislation explicitly expanding information sharing, particularly as between CBSA, CIC (now IRCC), CRA, and law enforcement.
The scope of what can be shared if there is CAUSE (grounds, reasons) ranges widely beyond what can be routinely shared. Cause trumps privacy to the extent of the government's articulated need for the information in a specific case. Again, the upper range in this is the full-blown, judicially issued criminal warrant, pursuant to which investigators can obtain in-depth access into an individual's government records. The "cause" must be particular to the individual, sufficient to justify the particular intrusion into the individual's privacy.
But the potential scope of this is, of course, huge, recognizing that if the government has sufficient reason the courts can issue warrants allowing a search of a person's home and the seizure of records and computer equipment and so on in the individual's home or office. Obviously, records held by other government bodies can likewise be the subject of a warrant. There is very little which is totally beyond the reach of a criminal investigation.
That end of the spectrum is a long, long way from routine inquiries conducted in the course of processing a citizenship application. This is NOT anything to have the slightest thought about, let alone worry about, for the qualified citizenship applicant who has provided truthful information.
But anyone who has submitted inconsistent information to different government bodies related to obtaining some government benefit (ranging from tax deductions to benefit payments, from credits to immigration or citizenship status) has reason to worry that one or other of the government bodies involved will identify reason to make further inquiries, conduct an investigation, and discover any false information submitted to one or the other government body. A lot of this, a lot of fraud, is done and not discovered. A lot of this that is done is discovered. The government provides secure housing, meals and bars on the windows are included, for the more egregious cases.
Address information generally:
In routine citizenship application processing there are many ways in which a processing agent can expand an inquiry to verify residential addresses provided by the applicant. Whether a processing agent does pursue any additional inquiry likely depends on whether something or the other triggers a question or concern. There are many indications that IRCC is increasingly accessing open source information, ranging from social media and Canada411, to online sites like LinkedIn, ordinary internet search engine queries, and it would be surprising if IRCC does not somewhat routinely at least glance at google maps, perhaps even in street view, to get an idea about some if not many declared addresses. Looking for incongruities.
Here too, the difference between what is routine versus what is done if IRCC has some suspicions about a particular applicant undoubtedly ranges widely. Routine: cursory look at applicant's information. Reason for suspicion: more in-depth review of information ranging up to a RCMP referral for investigation.
Additionally, it is now likely that GCMS records are kept for particular addresses, at least postal codes. We know for sure that there are GCMS records for some employers, those who have been identified as providing unreliable information in the past, or identified as associated with someone who has been involved in immigration, residency, or citizenship fraud. Thus, even in the routine application processing, a processing agent probably runs GCMS queries to see if there is a hit in the records against any address or employer declared by the applicant.
But again there are many approaches IRCC can take, and undoubtedly sometimes does take, to verify the applicant's address and employer information. Again, this undoubtedly ranges from cursory cross-checks for the vast majority of applicants, to intensely elevated scrutiny and even criminal investigations for those applicants who IRCC has suspicions regarding.
All this will be criteria-driven, fact-based, and rule governed. So it is not as if IRCC is at all likely to engage in unfounded fishing expeditions.
Apart from moral imperatives, there is a solid, practical reason for sticking to the truth in reporting information to the government: that is what works best most of the time. Those who do otherwise tend to get a stiff neck from always looking over their shoulders. Frankly, been there, done that, know the score, learned a lesson, paid the piper. Kind of like doubling down every hand playing black jack, sooner than later you go broke.
Do you know why IRCC only asked for consent for CRA and CBSA, but we keep hearing about them making referrals or instigation to other govt bodies? I would think any time IRCC doesn't have a prior consent about something and they are digging through it then it would be an infringement privacy. I don't know, just thinking out loud here.
Also, for the part where you mentioned people reporting diff info to diff government about tax deduction, and benefit payment. Could you give an example of how someone would report diff things to other govt agency to receive benefit they aren't entitled to? Thanks, as always!
Referrals for investigation are UNUSUAL. Not sure why you "keep hearing about them making referrals or instigation to other govt bodies." Unless you have been hanging out at the court house and watching proceedings for criminal cases. (I am familiar with this stuff because I read a lot about the law and courts and related information.)
If there are grounds for further inquiry in a particular individual's case, how would that infringe the individual's privacy? Again, these procedures (which again do not happen in routine cases) are criteria-driven, fact-based, rule-governed. Even referrals for additional information from other government bodies, well short of a referral for a formal investigation, must be done following carefully prescribed procedures and supported by reasonable cause in the particular individual's case. These are not fishing expeditions. Privacy is protected. But where the government has good reason to access information, it can employ the procedures available to obtain that additional information in a specific case.
Thus, if the government has cause to believe a fraud has been committed, obviously it has the authority to seek and obtain evidence related to the fraud. The government must employ proper procedures to assure there is no abuse and a person's privacy rights are protected. But of course there is no privacy right protecting fraud.
As for examples of fraud on the government, do you really need someone to give you examples? From tax fraud, to child benefit fraud, from EI fraud to disability payment fraud, and from residency fraud to keep PR status to residency fraud to obtain citizenship status, and there is fraudulent use of health care benefits by individuals not meeting the residency requirements, and so on; there is no shortage of people scamming the government.
That noted, however, the vast, vast majority of citizenship applicants are honest immigrants striving to establish a life in Canada, no fraud in play.
Let's be frank: the applicant who has not engaged in any deliberate effort to deceive the government has NOTHING to worry about. Those who have submitted false information, on the other hand, they do have reason to worry. No rocket science necessary.
As for examples of fraud on the government, do you really need someone to give you examples? From tax fraud, to child benefit fraud, from EI fraud to disability payment fraud, and from residency fraud to keep PR status to residency fraud to obtain citizenship status, and there is fraudulent use of health care benefits by individuals not meeting the residency requirements, and so on; there is no shortage of people scamming the government.
IRCC is responsible only for assessing whether the applicant met the income tax filing requirement of the Citizenship Act. Citizenship officers are not responsible for interpreting the Income Tax Act to determine tax compliance. At present, IRCC does not yet have the necessary agreements in place to return information to the CRA to assist the CRA with their investigations/enforcement. Work is ongoing to develop procedures to allow IRCC to advise the CRA of potential issues with tax filing history. Until procedures are in place, please contact CIT Operations (IRCC) for guidance in these circumstances.
From what IRCC have on their website concerning income tax requirement, it really contradicts the public perception about IRCC and CRA info sharing (As for examples of fraud on the government, do you really need someone to give you examples? From tax fraud, to child benefit fraud, from EI fraud to disability payment fraud). I myself don't have any reason for concern, I applied with over 1500 days of physical presence and I have been filing my income tax since 2011. What I definitely have issues with is the mixup from IRCC and their double-info.