It is accurate to say that the legal mechanism relating to cessation of refugee protection on the basis of reavailment requires a distinction between what might be described as the "actual reavailment of protection" versus what constitutes merely occasional or incidental contacts with the refugee's home country. See, for example,
the Kuoch decision. Thus, for example, merely visiting one's home country will not, in itself, constitute reavailment and thus not be sufficient grounds for cessation of protected person status.
But to support a finding of reavailment it is not necessary for Canada to show that the person with protected status did something, in the home country, on the scale of setting up a business, enrolling one's children in school, purchasing a home, or such. Indeed, these circumstances refer to a wholly separate ground for cessation of protected person status.
The relevant IRPA provisions are in
Section 108.(1), which lists the specific grounds for cessation of protected person status.