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2 possibilities :
1) both your security and your physical presence are complex.
2) IRCC is sleeping a bit on your application, and in practice it doesn't change anything. When they check your physical presence and language is not gonna lengthen the processing if a long background check is in the cards.

For what it's worth, a family member of mine, still waiting for the CSIS screening to complete on a mid 2023 application, got LP after 9 months, which is pretty much your current processing time.
I think it is 2nd point.
As I am a single applicant came on PR so my physical presence should be straightforward and I have done ielts so language should be easy too.

I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application. So very concerning for me.

But thanks a lot for your msg
 
2 possibilities :
1) both your security and your physical presence are complex.
2) IRCC is sleeping a bit on your application, and in practice it doesn't change anything. When they check your physical presence and language is not gonna lengthen the processing if a long background check is in the cards.

For what it's worth, a family member of mine, still waiting for the CSIS screening to complete on a mid 2023 application, got LP after 9 months, which is pretty much your current processing time.
I think it is 2nd point.
As I am a single applicant came on PR so my physical presence should be straightforward and I have done ielts so language should be easy too.

I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application. So very concerning for me.

But thanks a lot for your msg
 
I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application.
Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.
 
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Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.
My criminality is passed but it is still PM 03 ... it is under location section of GCMS Notes

My background is pending because of CSIS Screening and LPP is pending too but Criminality is passed by RCMP
 
Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.

I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" beyond that described in the source you link), let alone any correlations with the processing of citizenship applications.

Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . . but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.

Also see sidebar below.

My criminality is passed but it is still PM 03 ... it is under location section of GCMS Notes

My background is pending because of CSIS Screening and LPP is pending too but Criminality is passed by RCMP

I am not much help here. Best I can offer is that you know yourself, full history and all, so you should have a good sense as to . . .
-- whether you should pay a lawyer to dive into your details, confidentially, but only if and when you want; or
-- whether there is nothing to worry about, in your history to now, so even if you have to wait some months, into a year maybe (hopefully not anywhere near that) longer than others, you will get the opportunity to take the oath.​

But you could help here (it seems to me) if you further explain what you know about your GCMS showing "PM 03" (including other discussions about PM 03 in this forum).

I know no more than what the SECU September 19, 2024 information shows, indicating that there are these Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny," which is why (according to the SECU information) applications in which criminality is suspected can only be assessed and decided by this level of decision makers . . . inviting curiosity as to what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.

Sidebar (regarding earlier what is "non-routine," and what does it mean discussion):

It seems that recently IRCC has been referring more to "complex" or "high complex" application processing rather than "non-routine," which should help some applicants distinguish their situation better than just the "non-routine" description has, assuming that applicants will be given accurate information as to whether their application is complex or high complex, the latter being more problematic, and involving a significantly longer processing time.

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, applications referred for a full CBSA/NSSD or CSIS investigation, which could add many months or a year or more to the processing timeline, were likewise non-routine applications. So this non-routine description offered very little insight into how the application was progressing through the process.

Has not been confirmed yet (that I have seen), but my sense is the shift to distinguishing complex and high complex applications flows from or is part of the implementation of more automated assessment facilitating less eyes-on processing for a high percentage of applications. This is likely to reduce processing times for a large number of applicants. How it will affect the remainder (likewise no small number), those determined to be complex or high complex, is yet to be seen.
 
Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . . but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.
You can get to the full set of notes / table of contents here:
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...arency/committees/secu-september-19-2024.html

These are notes prepared - I presume from the text - for an appearance before the SECU by some departmental representative.

You can get a sense of what this was about from the contents and notes (I believe there was a scandal about someone getting PR status and/or citizenship who'd been arrested on terror allegations).

The committee's work in parliament can be found here:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/committees/en/SECU/Work?show=allwork&parl=44&session=1

(Select by session, no info under current session yet).

More relevant one for citizenship and immigratino is this one:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/CIMM/Work?parl=44&session=1

I think there's generally a lot more info there than people realise.
 
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I read it online somewhere

So if you could say where online - or even better provide a link - that would be great! I'd love to see the source.
But you could help here (it seems to me) if you further explain what you know about your GCMS showing "PM 03" (including other discussions about PM 03 in this forum).

I second this (though I fear there's likely not much more than say a an unsourced post on Facebook or the like).
PM01 is junior level officer and PM03 is someone senior

This makes sense. I guess the article I found didn't say that explicitly, so it could have been the opposite. Like for example, PM05 is the junior, PM03 is senior, and PM01 is the Prime Minister...
so it takes more time with PM03 level

That's a reasonable inference, does your online source state the same thing or is this just our conclusion based on the overall information?

In theory it might just be that we need a PM03 to decide based on the factors but the PM03 has a speedy checklist so it doesn't take longer. Though from what else I've read about IRCC I strongly would doubt this is the case... (I'm just borrowing an example from customer support (of private businesses) where the first entry level person you speak to isn't familiar with your exact situation and has to spend some time looking up stuff, while when you get their supervisor the super is able to sort it out in a few moments.)

I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" beyond that described in the source you link)

Hmm. I don't understand why this information isn't public. We know, for example that in the military a sergeant outranks a private, but a general is above the sergeant, etc. (Like we don't know the names of everyone who's a private in the military we don't necessarily have to know the names of everyone who's a "Level-2 delegated decision mater" - we just have to know what the rank itself means and in comparision to other ranks.)
Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . .

I wasn't sure either, so thanks armoured for finding the answer!
These are notes prepared - I presume from the text - for an appearance before the SECU by some departmental representative.

You can get a sense of what this was about from the contents and notes (I believe there was a scandal about someone getting PR status and/or citizenship who'd been arrested on terror allegations).
but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.

I think there's generally a lot more info there than people realise.

Agreed. Certainly I didn't realize either - so again thanks for all this.
I am not much help here. Best I can offer is that you know yourself, full history and all, so you should have a good sense as to . . .
-- whether you should pay a lawyer to dive into your details, confidentially, but only if and when you want; or
-- whether there is nothing to worry about, in your history to now, so even if you have to wait some months, into a year maybe (hopefully not anywhere near that) longer than others, you will get the opportunity to take the oath.​

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal.

This is interesting. On another thread (see https://www.canadavisa.com/canada-i...citizenship-applications.869454/post-11093710 ) someone mentioned that an FP request alone doesn't make the application non-routine (for an application that has absolutely nothing - NOTHING - to worry about aside from the FP request itself and a super common name) - but it sounds like they were using a different definition of non-routine (in particular it seems they may have meant that an FP request doesn't make an application more "complex" by the definition you've relayed from IRCC below).
Sidebar (regarding earlier what is "non-routine," and what does it mean discussion):

It seems that recently IRCC has been referring more to "complex" or "high complex" application processing rather than "non-routine," which should help some applicants distinguish their situation better than just the "non-routine" description has, assuming that applicants will be given accurate information as to whether their application is complex or high complex, the latter being more problematic, and involving a significantly longer processing time.

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, applications referred for a full CBSA/NSSD or CSIS investigation, which could add many months or a year or more to the processing timeline, were likewise non-routine applications. So this non-routine description offered very little insight into how the application was progressing through the process.

This makes sense. Certainly just using better terminology is helpful. Hopefully they'll release an official glossary at some point.
Has not been confirmed yet (that I have seen), but my sense is the shift to distinguishing complex and high complex applications flows from or is part of the implementation of more automated assessment facilitating less eyes-on processing for a high percentage of applications. This is likely to reduce processing times for a large number of applicants. How it will affect the remainder (likewise no small number), those determined to be complex or high complex, is yet to be seen.

Here's hoping that it ends up being more on the helpful side...
I know no more than what the SECU September 19, 2024 information shows, indicating that there are these Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny," which is why (according to the SECU information) applications in which criminality is suspected can only be assessed and decided by this level of decision makers . . . inviting curiosity as to what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.

Same. Again, I don't understand how this info is not public - surely this sort of thing is relevant when getting to the courts? (They have to know who made the decision and why, after all, and I could see the question of why it went to a certain level of decision maker being something that got, for lack of a better term, questioned.) Or - maybe it is and we just haven't found the right references yet...
 
This makes sense. I guess the article I found didn't say that explicitly, so it could have been the opposite. Like for example, PM05 is the junior, PM03 is senior, and PM01 is the Prime Minister...
In theory it might just be that we need a PM03 to decide based on the factors but the PM03 has a speedy checklist so it doesn't take longer.
Hmm. I don't understand why this information isn't public. We know, for example that in the military a sergeant outranks a private, but a general is above the sergeant, etc. (Like we don't know the names of everyone who's a private in the military we don't necessarily have to know the names of everyone who's a "Level-2 delegated decision mater" - we just have to know what the rank itself means and in comparision to other ranks.)

Same. Again, I don't understand how this info is not public - surely this sort of thing is relevant when getting to the courts? (They have to know who made the decision and why, after all, and I could see the question of why it went to a certain level of decision maker being something that got, for lack of a better term, questioned.) Or - maybe it is and we just haven't found the right references yet...
You can search and do a wee bit of research and find. My tip would be search for something like PM salary ranges, and compare to executive service.

In short: PM01 is absolutely junior level (only lower is pm-development, which I guess is training). PM03 is not very high at all, as PM goes up to PM07 - call it mid-range. I do not know the designated decision levels, but intuitively - they go up (there's surely more than 3 levels, and this is not a high one) - i.e. level 1 clearance is probably the lowest and/or the lowest with human clearance. [Now I'd be the last to say that salary is the only measure, but it is a measure that's going to be related to responsibility and authority.]

The fancy language quoted about knowledge/training specific to this designated decision level is "Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny,".

My intuition is that this means some experience (at least a year or more in something relevant), some specific training (probably a combination of subject specific trainings that most staff get on everything from systems to processing to a range of 'detection techniques' plus one or two short courses specific to this delegation level), etc. (Probably minimum requirements of various types, too, incl some specific security clearance level). This might be a person working in charge of a small team or someone on a larger team who does processing of all kinds but has to sign off on the more complex ones.

But note in this case - if my intuition is correct that this is mid-to-low clearance level, the important clearances are going to come from other agencies/partners or specialized units - part of what the training above is likely about is 'which agencies to check with / how to know when to ask for more' (based in part on what issues were flagged to kick it up from level 1, plus some additional research).

The level 2 clearance is (probably) when the difficult stuff comes back as "no significant issues." Meaning, constraint is not so much the time for this individual but how long 'other stuff' takes. [The ones that don't come back with all clear/nothing significant may get bumped up to level 3 or 4 or etc.]

This is of course speculation, albeit somewhat informed speculation. But if I'm more-or-less right, then I don't think the PM03 / Level 2 designation is that serious on its own - it just doesn't tell anyone the important bit. Sure, some delay compared to a file that doesn't have this desgnation - but insufficient information to say if just a bit or a lot. (More serious issues likely exempted from ATIP reviews...)
 
I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" . . .


Hmm. I don't understand why this information isn't public.

Again, I don't understand how this info is not public . . .

As the observations by @armoured illustrate, much of what you are referring to here actually is public information. Accessing it, and especially being able to readily access it, just finding it, is the trick. And a big part of the trick is figuring out what to look for and knowing how to navigate government information to find it and put it in context (the latter, putting it in context, is as important as finding it).

And then, of course, there's a ton of homework to do digesting and sorting what's relevant and what's useful. (Thus, for many if not most, an effort which falls into the black hole of willful ignorance epitomized by TLDR.)

Which is why I so much appreciate your initial link to the SECU information (a report of sorts?) which opened some very interesting windows . . .
. . . that is, opening some interesting windows FWII, so at least for me, someone who is very much interested in digging up what will help us sort out IRCC processing and procedures better, willing to do a lot of homework toward that end, but who still struggles some with Canadian idiom despite moving here nearly a quarter century ago (albeit for years relying on flag poling to avoid overstaying), being a Canadian for more than a decade and a half, a Canadian citizen for more than a decade, and despite first visiting Canada when Louis St. Laurent was Prime Minister (yeah mid-1950s, in my youth), and having first wrestled with the idea of moving to Canada in the early 1970s (more than a half century ago now).

Canadian idioms and terminology; and my ignorance:

Knowing the terminology is key to navigating and understanding information. That is obvious, of course, perhaps so obvious a Canadian judge might say it is "trite," which I will address further below (acknowledging I have developed a fondness for what is trite in that sense, even if its usage by FC judges is still unsettling).

It took me a good while to realize that just because English is my first and practically only language (notwithstanding a concerted effort to learn others), does not necessarily mean I understand (let alone fully understand) Canadian English. Did not take much time at all, however, to similarly recognize that notwithstanding nearly a half century deeply immersed in jurisprudence largely derived from British common law, I can also struggle to adequately (again let alone fully) understand the terminology, concepts, and basic principles in Canadian law, government, and bureaucracy.

I could write a book about that, albeit a book that few (if any) are likely to read (even if anyone was actually reading books anymore, in this age when whole paragraphs tend to tax the typical attention span).

So let this focus on just one aspect of the SECU information from the . . . I don't know whether to call these a memo? a report? committee notes? . . . the one you initially cited and linked titled "SECU - Citizenship - September 19, 2024" which (again) is here:
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

Under the subtitle "Supplementary Information" there is information further subtitled beginning with "If pressed . . . " For example:

"If pressed on the process to find an applicant prohibited for national security or organized criminality"​

As much as I research and study this stuff, and notwithstanding what I suppose (more than a mere guess) this is about, I cannot confidently say who is the one "pressed" or who "pressed" them, whether this is about MPs responding to questions from the press/media, from constituents, or from IRCC clients, or whether it is about government personnel (IRCC or otherwise) responding to questions, or . . . but it's rather obvious that many of the responses are vague generalities of policy or practice.

For this particular item, for example, "if pressed" about the process for determining a citizenship applicant is prohibited for national security or organized criminality, it vaguely describes in general terms a "specific process" which, the SECU information goes on to say "was last initiated in the mid-1990s," so not quite a hot topic illuminating current processing practices (noting, nonetheless, that the authority for this underlies investigations, which in turn underlies scores of referrals to CSIS resulting in lengthy periods of time in which there is no progress made in processing the citizenship application, which is behind a lot of criticism and more than a little vitriol in this forum).

The level 2 clearance is (probably) when the difficult stuff comes back as "no significant issues." Meaning, constraint is not so much the time for this individual but how long 'other stuff' takes.

Assuming the content in the SECU notes/report/memo is accurate, it is clear that a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) is qualified to determine if a citizenship applicant is prohibited for criminality, which would result in the citizenship application being denied. As I previously queried, I wonder what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.

That said, I fully concur in the following observation:

I don't think the PM03 / Level 2 designation is that serious on its own - it just doesn't tell anyone the important bit. Sure, some delay compared to a file that doesn't have this desgnation - but insufficient information to say if just a bit or a lot.

Noting, for example, that any record of charges in criminal databases likely triggers referral to a PM-03 (as an application in which criminality is suspected), which might be easily resolved if the charge was dismissed or was for a summary offence, resulting in some delay but not a lot. In contrast, if there is any suspect of a security related prohibition, that too is likely referred to a PM-03 but in the meantime the case is referred to CSIS or CBSA/NSSD for further investigation and potentially a very, very long delay.


Not So Trite Invocations of Trite Law:

It was perhaps a decade and a half ago when I encountered a reference to what is "trite" in a Federal Court decision reviewing a denied application for citizenship, referring to something that was clearly so true as to be above question. I was, well, stunned, appalled to the brink of outrage, that a Canadian Federal judge would so casually dismiss a fundamental truth, cast it off as "trite."

I misunderstood. I misinterpreted the use of the term "trite" in Canadian law. Despite my background in jurisprudence, my understanding of what it meant to characterize something as trite was probably more in a literary context than in the context of law.

When a professor of English characterizes something as trite, that means, in effect, throw it away.

But when a Federal Court judge in Canada characterizes something as trite, that means it is something so clearly true it is above question. Which is reflected in well over a thousand FC decisions, including scores and scores of decisions (well over a hundred) which state:
"It is trite law that the decision maker may assess and evaluate the evidence before it and that, absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with its factual findings."​

I do not recall the particular thing called trite that triggered my dismay, but will say in my defense the meaning was not nearly so obvious as it is in what I just quoted. Indeed, it may have been when I next encountered the use of "trite" in a FC decision it was in a statement like this one, switching on the lamp in my head, dimly at first perhaps but nonetheless illuminating how easy it is to misconstrue something due to misunderstanding how a particular term is used.

For example, I would not misunderstand it today, but a decade and a half ago I might have been confused by a FC decision stating that "It is trite [that IRCC's obligation to take action on removal orders as soon as possible] must be balanced against Canada’s obligation not to deport individuals without properly assessing their risk."

And, to be frank, I still find this manner of stating what is a fundamental principle or basic law, referring to it as trite, a bit unsettling. That is, as noted, notwithstanding the extent to which I have become a Canadian, I still struggle with the idioms and the particular usage of some terms in Canadian law and bureaucratic administration.

Canadian immigration is rife with all sorts of terms used in a particular way posing pitfalls for those failing to exercise caution in how they are interpreted and applied.
 
Under the subtitle "Supplementary Information" there is information further subtitled beginning with "If pressed . . . " For example:

"If pressed on the process to find an applicant prohibited for national security or organized criminality"​

As much as I research and study this stuff, and notwithstanding what I suppose (more than a mere guess) this is about, I cannot confidently say who is the one "pressed" or who "pressed" them, whether this is about MPs responding to questions from the press/media, from constituents, or from IRCC clients, or whether it is about government personnel (IRCC or otherwise) responding to questions, or . . . but it's rather obvious that many of the responses are vague generalities of policy or practice.
My understanding - based both on where this note was found (IRCC website, not a HoC committee site) and familiarity with the form: this "if pressed" makes clear this is a briefing note for 'an official' - i.e. the Minister, a deputy minister, or other senior- in this case testifying (or preparing to testify) to the House committee.

This is a somewhat standard briefing note, various points are responsive to the 'big question' (which will have a prepared text of some sort) and various somewhat-more detailed or expressly less detailed sub-points depending on questions asked and follow-ups. Similar notes with specific formats may be prepared for Question Period, press conferences, meetings of various types (international and domestic), really anything.

Important, seeing the briefing notes does NOT mean the statement or texts therein were ever actually made - and (unless the senior official is a truly tedious dolt) will almost never be made in the exact form and text the briefing note provides. (Some exceptions where the precise wording may have critical consequences - but if they know 'their brief', they'd know to avoid that).

Side note, many of these should - in theory - be 'obtainable' by access to information requests - for someone who is talented at finding the right wording and submitting such access to info requests. And they may contain information that didn't actually come up in the event for which they were prepared. (At the expense unfortunately of containing many banalities/non-response responses, depending on the nature of the event and topic).

This won't exempt from the usual exceptions to what is available (security, personal information of others, etc, of course). But there may be more there than is available from other sources. Unfortunately, any such briefing papers or similar prepared specifically for Cabinet discussions are strictly confidential (and therefore also exempt, I believe) - those would be the most revealing.
Assuming the content in the SECU notes/report/memo is accurate, it is clear that a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) is qualified to determine if a citizenship applicant is prohibited for criminality
I don't think this is obvious at all. I think it's possible - indeed likely - that there are multiple levels, where the lower levels are authorized to clear (pass) applicants (i.e. determine that they are not subject to prohibitions based on certain criteria) or refer them up to next level for consideration/decision - and/or if the officer is authorized to determine a prohibition, it may specify in what circumstances (what type of evidence) and perhaps also if any concurrences/counter-signatures needed (for example, legal dept or other depts with specific roles).

Or to give an example (necessarily hypothetical): one level of clearance for refusals where there is court record of criminality from a Canadian court (with certain specs like level of severity, how recent, etc), possibly with legal sign-off; kick up to next level/specific process for convictions in foreign courts (eg to determine equivalence); another level still for allegations of criminal conduct/ties abroad; etc. It's quite possible / likely that there is a tiering system used for reports/classifications from outside agencies based on risk factors (certain 'flags' would result in it being kicked up).

Approvals - same thing, really, I'm just noting that decisions for refusals may (likely IMO) have a tendency to be kicked up, refusals on such bases being less frequent. (In some cases outright rare).
Noting, for example, that any record of changes in criminal databases likely triggers referral to a PM-03 (as an application in which criminality is suspected), which might be easily resolved if the charge was dismissed or was for a summary offence, resulting in some delay but not a lot. In contrast, if there is any suspect of a security related prohibition, that too is likely referred to a PM-03 but in the meantime the case is referred to CSIS or CBSA/NSSD for further investigation and potentially a very, very long delay.
Good description.
 
For context, this is a weedy aside in regards to SECU information published online by IRCC, in regards to the Minister of IRCC's appearance before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) on Alleged Terrorist Immigration to Canada, September 19, 2024 (see link to full table of contents in post by @armoured above). . . and the particular information regarding this and citizenship (linked by @abff08f4813c above) . . .
My understanding - based both on where this note was found (IRCC website, not a HoC committee site) and familiarity with the form: this "if pressed" makes clear this is a briefing note for 'an official' - i.e. the Minister, a deputy minister, or other senior- in this case testifying (or preparing to testify) to the House committee.

What you describe is consistent with what I otherwise could and did "suppose," and helps me better understand the relationship between what is in that information, as published by IRCC, and the transcript of the actual meeting before SECU on September 19, 2024, which is here: https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/SECU/meeting-118/evidence#Int-12867088 and which, as one might anticipate, is riddled with political wrangling and posturing over procedural protocols . . . so a lot of work to sort through and not anywhere near as cogent as the published information, which itself, however, is full of rather broad and often vague generalities. But nonetheless illuminating and thus rather interesting for anyone willing to make the effort to mine and cross-reference data points.

One of the big take-aways, for example, is that between the notes (I'll buy your labeling) for the September 19, 2024 meeting, and others like those for a May 2022 meeting regarding ideologically motivated violent extremism, and those for another meeting in August 2024 (which contain the same notes in regards to citizenship as the notes for the September 2024 meeting)
it is readily apparent that in the last two to three years more citizenship applicants have been subject to elevated CSIS scrutiny as a result of some high profile cases that previously slipped past security screening. Which would be of interest to many of those engaged in the discussion of 2023 applicants stuck in security screening if they were actually interested in what is happening, why, and how it affects their applications.

But the main reason I addressed the "if pressed" aspect is to illustrate my personal lack of familiarity with that and many other aspects of information about the Canadian government notwithstanding how long and how extensively and how intensely I have been doing the homework . . . this stuff is not intuitive. To understand it demands an investment of time and effort. And there are plenty of pitfalls along the way.

Leading to my comment that
"Assuming the content in the SECU notes/report/memo is accurate, it is clear that a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) is qualified to determine if a citizenship applicant is prohibited for criminality,"​
to which you respond
I don't think this is obvious at all. I think it's possible - indeed likely - that there are multiple levels, where the lower levels are authorized to clear (pass) applicants (i.e. determine that they are not subject to prohibitions based on certain criteria) or refer them up to next level for consideration/decision - and/or if the officer is authorized to determine a prohibition, it may specify in what circumstances (what type of evidence) and perhaps also if any concurrences/counter-signatures needed (for example, legal dept or other depts with specific roles).

I know nothing about a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" in particular beyond what is stated in those notes for SECU. And I realize that the reference here to the PM-03 as a "decision-maker" might not be based on the same meaning of "decision-maker" used in other contexts by IRCC (in which decision maker is about who decides the outcome, who can approve or reject an application, in contrast to others engaged in processing applications making internal procedural decisions). But the SECU information specifically refers to any application involving a suspicion of criminality being one that can "only be assessed and decided upon" by a PM-03 decision-maker. That does not illuminate much about what information they can consider, who can they get the information from, who they can refer the case to for further inquiries or investigation, what particular information they must obtain or verify, or what they can base their decision on, but if it is accurate, it is referring to the PM-03 as the one who assesses and decides whether or not to deny an application for a prohibition based on criminality. Which makes sense.

In contrast, for example, the SECU information indicates an official/officer classified as PM-03 is not a decision-maker who can decide an applicant is prohibited for national security or organized criminality, as that involves a specific process involving a referral, a "report," to NSIA which investigates and refers the matter to the GIC as the decision-maker for this prohibition. Except, it appears, this almost never happens. (Which in most cases makes sense, by the way, since sufficient evidence to support a determination of this prohibition would almost always require documentation that would support an adverse decision on other grounds, such as a prohibition for criminality or misrepresentation, so no need in practice, in most situations anyway, to pursue the GIC determination.)

That said, as I previously agreed with you about the classification of decision-makers, this is not all that important, at least not for purposes of this forum and helping applicants understand and navigate the system; the classification of decision-makers in the IRCC hierarchy, who can make what determinations, does not illuminate much at all about the process or the criteria. If we could map the referral to a particular level of decision-maker with applications considered high-complex as distinguished from merely complex applications, that might illuminate a little about the prospective timeline, recognizing that high-complex cases are bound to take considerably longer than complex applications, which in turn already take considerably longer than non-complex applications.

And perhaps, for applicants like the individual here reporting they know their application has been referred to a PM-03 decision-maker, it is possible that such a referral does mean the application is considered high-complex, so is likely to take considerably longer than most other applications. But that is not for sure. And even if this is known, even if it means the application is high-complex and will take considerably longer, there is no reliable way to forecast how much longer that is, whether a few months or many months or into years.

For those of us engaged in mapping the big picture it is nonetheless interesting and helpful in that all this illuminates more parts of a large and complex puzzle.
 
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But the SECU information specifically refers to any application involving a suspicion of criminality being one that can "only be assessed and decided upon" by a PM-03 decision-maker.
I agree that some info will say this, and some others will contradict.

I'm working from intuition/experience with other institutions: what I'd call a cascading approval hierarchy, but I'm sure there are other names for it. Lending and investment companies (banks etc) use similar hierarchies, for example, but it didn't necessarily originate with them or exclusive to.

Simple yes/no answers, simple stuff, risk matrix giving some measure of how important: 1st level.

And so on and on up through (typically 3-5 levels - the highest level might be ad hoc and/or decision only by top leadership). The higher levels might be very large/important contracts where the (positive/derogatory) information is not clear and/or contradictory. As you go up, more likely will be a committee or series of people that need to sign off. (Lower decision levels may have minimum eg 'two pairs of eyes', higher - more).

Why I think the above information is wrong - gut that too low a level of decision-maker to decide anything based on 'suspicion' of criminality. Not clear-cut enough for relatively junior. 'Suspicion' of criminality would be more like ANY info related to criminality, that's what got it kicked up to the second level.

But I strongly doubt that level would be authorized to refuse (or approve) if the info that gave the suspicion of criminality hadn't been resolved - somewhat clear info - one way or the other. (Eg: initial criminality hits documented to be mistaken in some way (false database hit), or positively confirmed and level of criminality requiring refusal.)

Unclear info / requiring deeper analysis / other special cases - kick up.