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2 possibilities :
1) both your security and your physical presence are complex.
2) IRCC is sleeping a bit on your application, and in practice it doesn't change anything. When they check your physical presence and language is not gonna lengthen the processing if a long background check is in the cards.

For what it's worth, a family member of mine, still waiting for the CSIS screening to complete on a mid 2023 application, got LP after 9 months, which is pretty much your current processing time.
I think it is 2nd point.
As I am a single applicant came on PR so my physical presence should be straightforward and I have done ielts so language should be easy too.

I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application. So very concerning for me.

But thanks a lot for your msg
 
2 possibilities :
1) both your security and your physical presence are complex.
2) IRCC is sleeping a bit on your application, and in practice it doesn't change anything. When they check your physical presence and language is not gonna lengthen the processing if a long background check is in the cards.

For what it's worth, a family member of mine, still waiting for the CSIS screening to complete on a mid 2023 application, got LP after 9 months, which is pretty much your current processing time.
I think it is 2nd point.
As I am a single applicant came on PR so my physical presence should be straightforward and I have done ielts so language should be easy too.

I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application. So very concerning for me.

But thanks a lot for your msg
 
I got my gcms notes and it shows PM 03 level. Which people say means complex application.
Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.
 
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Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.
My criminality is passed but it is still PM 03 ... it is under location section of GCMS Notes

My background is pending because of CSIS Screening and LPP is pending too but Criminality is passed by RCMP
 
Out of curiosity, where did you see that?

The closest I've found is this, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html

> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.

I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" beyond that described in the source you link), let alone any correlations with the processing of citizenship applications.

Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . . but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.

Also see sidebar below.

My criminality is passed but it is still PM 03 ... it is under location section of GCMS Notes

My background is pending because of CSIS Screening and LPP is pending too but Criminality is passed by RCMP

I am not much help here. Best I can offer is that you know yourself, full history and all, so you should have a good sense as to . . .
-- whether you should pay a lawyer to dive into your details, confidentially, but only if and when you want; or
-- whether there is nothing to worry about, in your history to now, so even if you have to wait some months, into a year maybe (hopefully not anywhere near that) longer than others, you will get the opportunity to take the oath.​

But you could help here (it seems to me) if you further explain what you know about your GCMS showing "PM 03" (including other discussions about PM 03 in this forum).

I know no more than what the SECU September 19, 2024 information shows, indicating that there are these Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny," which is why (according to the SECU information) applications in which criminality is suspected can only be assessed and decided by this level of decision makers . . . inviting curiosity as to what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.

Sidebar (regarding earlier what is "non-routine," and what does it mean discussion):

It seems that recently IRCC has been referring more to "complex" or "high complex" application processing rather than "non-routine," which should help some applicants distinguish their situation better than just the "non-routine" description has, assuming that applicants will be given accurate information as to whether their application is complex or high complex, the latter being more problematic, and involving a significantly longer processing time.

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, applications referred for a full CBSA/NSSD or CSIS investigation, which could add many months or a year or more to the processing timeline, were likewise non-routine applications. So this non-routine description offered very little insight into how the application was progressing through the process.

Has not been confirmed yet (that I have seen), but my sense is the shift to distinguishing complex and high complex applications flows from or is part of the implementation of more automated assessment facilitating less eyes-on processing for a high percentage of applications. This is likely to reduce processing times for a large number of applicants. How it will affect the remainder (likewise no small number), those determined to be complex or high complex, is yet to be seen.
 
Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . . but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.
You can get to the full set of notes / table of contents here:
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...arency/committees/secu-september-19-2024.html

These are notes prepared - I presume from the text - for an appearance before the SECU by some departmental representative.

You can get a sense of what this was about from the contents and notes (I believe there was a scandal about someone getting PR status and/or citizenship who'd been arrested on terror allegations).

The committee's work in parliament can be found here:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/committees/en/SECU/Work?show=allwork&parl=44&session=1

(Select by session, no info under current session yet).

More relevant one for citizenship and immigratino is this one:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/CIMM/Work?parl=44&session=1

I think there's generally a lot more info there than people realise.
 
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I read it online somewhere

So if you could say where online - or even better provide a link - that would be great! I'd love to see the source.
But you could help here (it seems to me) if you further explain what you know about your GCMS showing "PM 03" (including other discussions about PM 03 in this forum).

I second this (though I fear there's likely not much more than say a an unsourced post on Facebook or the like).
PM01 is junior level officer and PM03 is someone senior

This makes sense. I guess the article I found didn't say that explicitly, so it could have been the opposite. Like for example, PM05 is the junior, PM03 is senior, and PM01 is the Prime Minister...
so it takes more time with PM03 level

That's a reasonable inference, does your online source state the same thing or is this just our conclusion based on the overall information?

In theory it might just be that we need a PM03 to decide based on the factors but the PM03 has a speedy checklist so it doesn't take longer. Though from what else I've read about IRCC I strongly would doubt this is the case... (I'm just borrowing an example from customer support (of private businesses) where the first entry level person you speak to isn't familiar with your exact situation and has to spend some time looking up stuff, while when you get their supervisor the super is able to sort it out in a few moments.)

I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" beyond that described in the source you link)

Hmm. I don't understand why this information isn't public. We know, for example that in the military a sergeant outranks a private, but a general is above the sergeant, etc. (Like we don't know the names of everyone who's a private in the military we don't necessarily have to know the names of everyone who's a "Level-2 delegated decision mater" - we just have to know what the rank itself means and in comparision to other ranks.)
Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . .

I wasn't sure either, so thanks armoured for finding the answer!
These are notes prepared - I presume from the text - for an appearance before the SECU by some departmental representative.

You can get a sense of what this was about from the contents and notes (I believe there was a scandal about someone getting PR status and/or citizenship who'd been arrested on terror allegations).
but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.

I think there's generally a lot more info there than people realise.

Agreed. Certainly I didn't realize either - so again thanks for all this.
I am not much help here. Best I can offer is that you know yourself, full history and all, so you should have a good sense as to . . .
-- whether you should pay a lawyer to dive into your details, confidentially, but only if and when you want; or
-- whether there is nothing to worry about, in your history to now, so even if you have to wait some months, into a year maybe (hopefully not anywhere near that) longer than others, you will get the opportunity to take the oath.​

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal.

This is interesting. On another thread (see https://www.canadavisa.com/canada-i...citizenship-applications.869454/post-11093710 ) someone mentioned that an FP request alone doesn't make the application non-routine (for an application that has absolutely nothing - NOTHING - to worry about aside from the FP request itself and a super common name) - but it sounds like they were using a different definition of non-routine (in particular it seems they may have meant that an FP request doesn't make an application more "complex" by the definition you've relayed from IRCC below).
Sidebar (regarding earlier what is "non-routine," and what does it mean discussion):

It seems that recently IRCC has been referring more to "complex" or "high complex" application processing rather than "non-routine," which should help some applicants distinguish their situation better than just the "non-routine" description has, assuming that applicants will be given accurate information as to whether their application is complex or high complex, the latter being more problematic, and involving a significantly longer processing time.

"Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, applications referred for a full CBSA/NSSD or CSIS investigation, which could add many months or a year or more to the processing timeline, were likewise non-routine applications. So this non-routine description offered very little insight into how the application was progressing through the process.

This makes sense. Certainly just using better terminology is helpful. Hopefully they'll release an official glossary at some point.
Has not been confirmed yet (that I have seen), but my sense is the shift to distinguishing complex and high complex applications flows from or is part of the implementation of more automated assessment facilitating less eyes-on processing for a high percentage of applications. This is likely to reduce processing times for a large number of applicants. How it will affect the remainder (likewise no small number), those determined to be complex or high complex, is yet to be seen.

Here's hoping that it ends up being more on the helpful side...
I know no more than what the SECU September 19, 2024 information shows, indicating that there are these Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny," which is why (according to the SECU information) applications in which criminality is suspected can only be assessed and decided by this level of decision makers . . . inviting curiosity as to what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.

Same. Again, I don't understand how this info is not public - surely this sort of thing is relevant when getting to the courts? (They have to know who made the decision and why, after all, and I could see the question of why it went to a certain level of decision maker being something that got, for lack of a better term, questioned.) Or - maybe it is and we just haven't found the right references yet...
 
This makes sense. I guess the article I found didn't say that explicitly, so it could have been the opposite. Like for example, PM05 is the junior, PM03 is senior, and PM01 is the Prime Minister...
In theory it might just be that we need a PM03 to decide based on the factors but the PM03 has a speedy checklist so it doesn't take longer.
Hmm. I don't understand why this information isn't public. We know, for example that in the military a sergeant outranks a private, but a general is above the sergeant, etc. (Like we don't know the names of everyone who's a private in the military we don't necessarily have to know the names of everyone who's a "Level-2 delegated decision mater" - we just have to know what the rank itself means and in comparision to other ranks.)

Same. Again, I don't understand how this info is not public - surely this sort of thing is relevant when getting to the courts? (They have to know who made the decision and why, after all, and I could see the question of why it went to a certain level of decision maker being something that got, for lack of a better term, questioned.) Or - maybe it is and we just haven't found the right references yet...
You can search and do a wee bit of research and find. My tip would be search for something like PM salary ranges, and compare to executive service.

In short: PM01 is absolutely junior level (only lower is pm-development, which I guess is training). PM03 is not very high at all, as PM goes up to PM07 - call it mid-range. I do not know the designated decision levels, but intuitively - they go up (there's surely more than 3 levels, and this is not a high one) - i.e. level 1 clearance is probably the lowest and/or the lowest with human clearance. [Now I'd be the last to say that salary is the only measure, but it is a measure that's going to be related to responsibility and authority.]

The fancy language quoted about knowledge/training specific to this designated decision level is "Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny,".

My intuition is that this means some experience (at least a year or more in something relevant), some specific training (probably a combination of subject specific trainings that most staff get on everything from systems to processing to a range of 'detection techniques' plus one or two short courses specific to this delegation level), etc. (Probably minimum requirements of various types, too, incl some specific security clearance level). This might be a person working in charge of a small team or someone on a larger team who does processing of all kinds but has to sign off on the more complex ones.

But note in this case - if my intuition is correct that this is mid-to-low clearance level, the important clearances are going to come from other agencies/partners or specialized units - part of what the training above is likely about is 'which agencies to check with / how to know when to ask for more' (based in part on what issues were flagged to kick it up from level 1, plus some additional research).

The level 2 clearance is (probably) when the difficult stuff comes back as "no significant issues." Meaning, constraint is not so much the time for this individual but how long 'other stuff' takes. [The ones that don't come back with all clear/nothing significant may get bumped up to level 3 or 4 or etc.]

This is of course speculation, albeit somewhat informed speculation. But if I'm more-or-less right, then I don't think the PM03 / Level 2 designation is that serious on its own - it just doesn't tell anyone the important bit. Sure, some delay compared to a file that doesn't have this desgnation - but insufficient information to say if just a bit or a lot. (More serious issues likely exempted from ATIP reviews...)