I am not sure if i am in IP2 or IP1.. yeah probably in security screening.. will get GCMS in 20 days
Those who Waiting EXPRESS ENTRY in Six Months and not finalized!!!!
- Thread starter mannual
- Start date
In support of this argument that cbsa can opt for verification in applicants home country, here is another ircc internal manual which establishes the close cooperation of IRCC and CBSA identifying fruad/misrepresentation with respect to factors that might lead to inadmissibility. NOTE: IT IS NOT CLEAR AT WHAT STAGE THESE ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED.
The appended manual of IRCC (click on this link http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/RESOURCES/manuals/op/op23-eng.pdf) provides mind boggling vidence of the coordination between CBSA and IRCC with respect to not only security but verification of every type regarding info and documents we have provided as part of our PR application. This is just a summary of overview of policy and procedures on the detection of fraud in the immigration program. It outlines how the responsibilities for fraud detection are shared between Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) pg3. It might be that fraud detection activities of CBSA/IRCC separate from SS. @conroex3800 suggests that fraud detection activities are part of SS, but there is no concrete evidence that can be cited from any of the IRCC links that i have shared.From here on, I am not even paraphrasing. I am copy-pasting directly from IRCC manual.
Within the CIC/CBSA community, the objective of anti-fraud activities is to protect the integrity of Canada’s immigration programs by preventing:
• program abuse;
• the use of fraudulent documents; and
• application misrepresentation.
Effective anti-fraud detection measures will help ensure proper selection of immigrants and entry of admissible temporary residents, and will ensure that inadmissible persons are effectively identified and denied entry into Canada, or removed accordingly. The Act provides specific authority to refuse the application of a person who engages in misrepresentation or the withholding of material facts.
Within the larger community, effective fraud prevention measures support law enforcement and work to ensure the integrity of programs delivered by the federal government or other levels of government such as health care or social assistance.
Anti-fraud activities are linked to the intelligence information cycle. The communication of organized or systematic attempts by clients to circumvent proper evaluation and to misrepresent information is fed into intelligence-gathering systems so that trends may be identified, analysed and communicated to all officers dealing with such cases. This improves the effectiveness of anti-fraud and program integrity activities and techniques.
It is the policy of the federal government that serious or organized abuses of Canada’s immigration programs be subject to criminal prosecution. Where anti-fraud and program integrity activities conducted by CIC or CBSA personnel result in findings of serious or organized instances of abuse, the matter will be referred to local authorities or the RCMP for further investigation to determine whether charges for offences under A126 or A127 may be warranted. Pg3
The need to conduct anti-fraud verification and program integrity activities exists at all steps of immigration processing. It is therefore the responsibility of the CIC or CBSA officer, who is designated or has the delegated authority to receive and evaluate information, to question the veracity of information, to identify missing or conflicting information, to evaluate the authenticity of documents, to confirm identity, and to determine whether further verification is required. Pg6
The CBSA plays a key role in supporting CIC in the implementation of its Integrated Risk Management Framework through ongoing development and the sharing of intelligence information and products, such as screening tools and country profiles, and through investigations and enforcement activities under IRPA. Pg 7
CIC and the CBSA have a joint responsibility for ensuring the integrity of Canada’s immigration program and the prevention of fraud within and outside Canada.
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The CBSA’s primary responsibility is to ensure public safety and security at Canada’s borders and to work with CIC in managing and delivering the immigration enforcement program. An essential element of this responsibility is to provide comprehensive and timely strategic and operational immigration intelligence to CIC, as their primary client, in the delivery of Canada’s immigration program. The CBSA, with CIC’s assistance, will take the lead role in assessing the admissibility of cases involving risks to national security. The CBSA, in consultation with CIC, has the lead role in directing the Migration Integrity Officer (MIO) function. The responsibilities of CIC and the CBSA require the support and exchange of information with domestic and international organizations and partners within the law-enforcement and security community.
CIC has the primary responsibility for screening, detecting and preventing first-level fraud and for assessing eligibility for benefits under Canada’s immigration and citizenship programs. Safeguarding program integrity includes the prevention of the misuse and abuse of the immigration program, quality assurance and overall responsibility for ensuring immigration program integrity. This requires that CIC continue to ensure that best practices are in place to detect fraud and malfeasance and to identify their broader fraudulent concerns to the CBSA for action. Pg7
Two levels of anti-fraud activities
First-level anti-fraud activities occur when, in the normal course of their duties, CIC and CBSA officers are required to verify client information and documentation. As a result, these officers are the first point for detecting fraud and initiating investigations. CIC and CBSA service delivery points, visa offices, case processing centres (CPCs), local/inland CIC offices, and POE immigration offices and MIOs for the CBSA all have the responsibility for the delivery of first-level anti-fraud activities, both in and out of Canada.
The CPCs deal with mail-in applications containing mainly photocopies of documents. When the CPC case processing officers suspect fraud or misrepresentation in a case, they refer it to the Strategic Analysis/Anti-fraud officers for further verifications. Questionable cases are referred to local CIC offices for further investigation.
First-level anti-fraud activities may include: • phone, fax or internet verification; targeted client interview; • consultation with other CIC/CBSA offices or other Canadian government agencies; • consultation with other governments, which may involve ongoing liaison activities; • collection and analysis of information to identify local patterns and trends in fraud or misrepresentation; • development of local verification tools and procedures; • site visit (visa office, case specific). CIC inland officers perform out-of-office investigations only for benefit-driven cases (e.g., entrepreneur compliance with conditions; school visits to determine school bona fides as well as to confirm attendance).
Second-level anti-fraud activities include strategic and targeted intelligence and investigative activities that are undertaken to detect and respond to fraudulent documentation or misrepresentation that target the immigration program. The CBSA has the responsibility for the delivery of second-level anti-fraud policy, procedures, and operations both in Canada and abroad. These include: • the active collection and analysis of information to identify regional or global patterns and trends in fraud or misrepresentation; • field investigations to develop intelligence and to support case officers using a variety of methods such as site visits and fraud interviews; • enhanced document examination to identify counterfeit or alteration techniques; • dissemination of intelligence including reports, bulletins and alerts to both CIC and the CBSA so they can revise operations, priorities and best practices to ensure program integrity; • collaboration with domestic and international partners in support of program integrity, public safety and security including building cases and making recommendations for criminal investigation and prosecution. Pg8. The purpose of these distinctions is to provide a framework and general rules of agreement between the two organizations to explain how anti-fraud investigations will be conducted and to clarify the requirements and expectations of each organization. Pg9
5.5. Relationship between quality assurance and anti-fraud activities
In defining quality-assurance and anti-fraud activities, it is important to recognize that they play an important role with regard to program integrity, and are key aspects of the Integrated Risk Management Framework for the immigration program. The two functions, while complementary, remain distinct in their goals. It is clear that quality-assurance activities are closely linked with management, client service and program-audit functions and, therefore, they remain within the mandate of CIC.
Quality assurance refers to planned and systematic processes, usually involving random sampling (either one time or ongoing), used to monitor and assess established procedures. Quality-assurance exercises are conducted on the quality of decision-making and the reliability of client information, normally focusing on specific program activities or business lines within the immigration program including: • application of legislation; • uniformity and accuracy of assessment of file information;
• verification procedures and the validity of information and documentation on which decisions are based (which may lead to the identification of misrepresentation or fraud); • design, development and maintenance of tools to support decision-making and quality-assurance activities; • development of sampling and tracking procedures; • establishment of protocols for reporting and follow-up on findings of quality assurance.
The goal of the Quality Assurance Program is to ensure efficiency, accuracy and consistency in decision-making and to ensure fairness and integrity in programs. Quality-assurance procedures are tools to identify program strengths (best practices) and those weaknesses that may require program enhancements. These include improved training or modification to policies and procedures.
The Anti-fraud program complements the Quality Assurance Program as identified and confirmed fraud patterns and trends provide feedback on areas that require quality-assurance follow-up to ensure program integrity. The reverse also applies as quality-assurance activities can detect cases of fraud, which can be referred for investigation and follow-up action.
CIC has the primary responsibility for screening, detecting and preventing first-level fraud and for assessing eligibility for benefits under Canada’s immigration and citizenship programs. Safeguarding program integrity includes the prevention of the misuse and abuse of the immigration program, quality assurance and overall responsibility for ensuring immigration program integrity. This requires that CIC continue to ensure that best practices are in place to detect fraud and malfeasance and to identify their broader fraudulent concerns to the CBSA for action. Pg7
Two levels of anti-fraud activities
First-level anti-fraud activities occur when, in the normal course of their duties, CIC and CBSA officers are required to verify client information and documentation. As a result, these officers are the first point for detecting fraud and initiating investigations. CIC and CBSA service delivery points, visa offices, case processing centres (CPCs), local/inland CIC offices, and POE immigration offices and MIOs for the CBSA all have the responsibility for the delivery of first-level anti-fraud activities, both in and out of Canada.
The CPCs deal with mail-in applications containing mainly photocopies of documents. When the CPC case processing officers suspect fraud or misrepresentation in a case, they refer it to the Strategic Analysis/Anti-fraud officers for further verifications. Questionable cases are referred to local CIC offices for further investigation.
First-level anti-fraud activities may include: • phone, fax or internet verification; targeted client interview; • consultation with other CIC/CBSA offices or other Canadian government agencies; • consultation with other governments, which may involve ongoing liaison activities; • collection and analysis of information to identify local patterns and trends in fraud or misrepresentation; • development of local verification tools and procedures; • site visit (visa office, case specific). CIC inland officers perform out-of-office investigations only for benefit-driven cases (e.g., entrepreneur compliance with conditions; school visits to determine school bona fides as well as to confirm attendance).
Second-level anti-fraud activities include strategic and targeted intelligence and investigative activities that are undertaken to detect and respond to fraudulent documentation or misrepresentation that target the immigration program. The CBSA has the responsibility for the delivery of second-level anti-fraud policy, procedures, and operations both in Canada and abroad. These include: • the active collection and analysis of information to identify regional or global patterns and trends in fraud or misrepresentation; • field investigations to develop intelligence and to support case officers using a variety of methods such as site visits and fraud interviews; • enhanced document examination to identify counterfeit or alteration techniques; • dissemination of intelligence including reports, bulletins and alerts to both CIC and the CBSA so they can revise operations, priorities and best practices to ensure program integrity; • collaboration with domestic and international partners in support of program integrity, public safety and security including building cases and making recommendations for criminal investigation and prosecution. Pg8. The purpose of these distinctions is to provide a framework and general rules of agreement between the two organizations to explain how anti-fraud investigations will be conducted and to clarify the requirements and expectations of each organization. Pg9
5.5. Relationship between quality assurance and anti-fraud activities
In defining quality-assurance and anti-fraud activities, it is important to recognize that they play an important role with regard to program integrity, and are key aspects of the Integrated Risk Management Framework for the immigration program. The two functions, while complementary, remain distinct in their goals. It is clear that quality-assurance activities are closely linked with management, client service and program-audit functions and, therefore, they remain within the mandate of CIC.
Quality assurance refers to planned and systematic processes, usually involving random sampling (either one time or ongoing), used to monitor and assess established procedures. Quality-assurance exercises are conducted on the quality of decision-making and the reliability of client information, normally focusing on specific program activities or business lines within the immigration program including: • application of legislation; • uniformity and accuracy of assessment of file information;
• verification procedures and the validity of information and documentation on which decisions are based (which may lead to the identification of misrepresentation or fraud); • design, development and maintenance of tools to support decision-making and quality-assurance activities; • development of sampling and tracking procedures; • establishment of protocols for reporting and follow-up on findings of quality assurance.
The goal of the Quality Assurance Program is to ensure efficiency, accuracy and consistency in decision-making and to ensure fairness and integrity in programs. Quality-assurance procedures are tools to identify program strengths (best practices) and those weaknesses that may require program enhancements. These include improved training or modification to policies and procedures.
The Anti-fraud program complements the Quality Assurance Program as identified and confirmed fraud patterns and trends provide feedback on areas that require quality-assurance follow-up to ensure program integrity. The reverse also applies as quality-assurance activities can detect cases of fraud, which can be referred for investigation and follow-up action.
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7.1. Essential elements of anti-fraud verification to strengthen program integrity
At all times during immigration processing, officers must be alert to the possibility of fraud and be vigilant when reviewing information and documentation. The basis of anti-fraud work is to continually look for signs of fraud and addressing any concerns either by conducting simple verifications or, where a second-level investigation is required, consulting with or referring the case to the CBSA. In assessing the possibility of fraud, officers should be guided by the following essential elements:
• Necessary measures should be taken to ensure that the applicant's true identity has been established. Verifying identity documents thoroughly will ensure that an application will not succeed if it is based upon impersonation, a stolen identity, or a fantasy identity. To this end, primary identity documents such as
passports, birth certificates, national identity cards, or others should be carefully screened and assessed for signs of alteration, improper issuance or counterfeiting.
• All supporting documents and information provided by the applicant must be genuine and truthful in nature. (A list citing examples of the types of supporting documents that could be verified is given in section 7.2 below on procedures related to "first-level" investigations). The CPCs deal with applications containing mainly photocopies of documents and do not see the clients. When CPC case processing officers suspect fraud or misrepresentation in a case, they may refer the case to the Strategic Analysis/Anti-fraud officers who can make further verifications and provide advice on their findings for further case processing, or the case may be referred directly to a local CIC, for further investigations.
• All third parties involved in the preparation of any application on behalf of an applicant, whether or not they have been formally declared as such, must act in good faith.
• Suspicions of organized fraud must be well documented and reported to the appropriate authorities. At visa offices, this will be the Migration Integrity Officer (MIO), if available, the Immigration Program Manager (IPM) or visa officer who will liaise with the RCMP Liaison Officer and local authorities who may conduct further investigations. In most instances within Canada, this will involve reporting the matter to the local CBSA Intelligence or Enforcement Office, which will inform NHQ, and the RCMP for possible further investigations. There will be situations (e.g., internal investigations) where CIC may refer the matter directly to the RCMP but it is recommended that the CBSA be informed of such referrals.
7.2. Conducting first-level verifications
The following provides an overview of the types of first-level verifications. (It is not an exhaustive list): • Analysis of FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS client history and the histories of related FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS clients, including:
relatives; persons travelling as part of a recognized delegation or group; previous travel/visa application history, such as: o what was the basis of past visa issuance/refusal decisions? o in relation to previous applications, are there contradictions or obvious inconsistencies with the current application?
Conducting first-level verifications
The following provides an overview of the types of first-level verifications. (It is not an exhaustive list): • Analysis of FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS client history and the histories of related FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS clients, including: Links to previous problem cases where fraud was confirmed
At all times during immigration processing, officers must be alert to the possibility of fraud and be vigilant when reviewing information and documentation. The basis of anti-fraud work is to continually look for signs of fraud and addressing any concerns either by conducting simple verifications or, where a second-level investigation is required, consulting with or referring the case to the CBSA. In assessing the possibility of fraud, officers should be guided by the following essential elements:
• Necessary measures should be taken to ensure that the applicant's true identity has been established. Verifying identity documents thoroughly will ensure that an application will not succeed if it is based upon impersonation, a stolen identity, or a fantasy identity. To this end, primary identity documents such as
passports, birth certificates, national identity cards, or others should be carefully screened and assessed for signs of alteration, improper issuance or counterfeiting.
• All supporting documents and information provided by the applicant must be genuine and truthful in nature. (A list citing examples of the types of supporting documents that could be verified is given in section 7.2 below on procedures related to "first-level" investigations). The CPCs deal with applications containing mainly photocopies of documents and do not see the clients. When CPC case processing officers suspect fraud or misrepresentation in a case, they may refer the case to the Strategic Analysis/Anti-fraud officers who can make further verifications and provide advice on their findings for further case processing, or the case may be referred directly to a local CIC, for further investigations.
• All third parties involved in the preparation of any application on behalf of an applicant, whether or not they have been formally declared as such, must act in good faith.
• Suspicions of organized fraud must be well documented and reported to the appropriate authorities. At visa offices, this will be the Migration Integrity Officer (MIO), if available, the Immigration Program Manager (IPM) or visa officer who will liaise with the RCMP Liaison Officer and local authorities who may conduct further investigations. In most instances within Canada, this will involve reporting the matter to the local CBSA Intelligence or Enforcement Office, which will inform NHQ, and the RCMP for possible further investigations. There will be situations (e.g., internal investigations) where CIC may refer the matter directly to the RCMP but it is recommended that the CBSA be informed of such referrals.
7.2. Conducting first-level verifications
The following provides an overview of the types of first-level verifications. (It is not an exhaustive list): • Analysis of FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS client history and the histories of related FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS clients, including:
relatives; persons travelling as part of a recognized delegation or group; previous travel/visa application history, such as: o what was the basis of past visa issuance/refusal decisions? o in relation to previous applications, are there contradictions or obvious inconsistencies with the current application?Conducting first-level verifications
The following provides an overview of the types of first-level verifications. (It is not an exhaustive list): • Analysis of FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS client history and the histories of related FOSS, CAIPS and NCMS clients, including: Links to previous problem cases where fraud was confirmed
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Open-source searches on information included in the application: Internet search engines, such as Google, to research names, businesses, references; whitepages.com, 411.ca, etc – to verify phone numbers to see if there is an associated address, name, or listing; LEXIS/NEXIS (a commercial electronic research database accessed by subscription over the internet. Using assigned passwords, users can access the new portion of this service where archived articles from newspapers, magazines and journals are available to be word-searched and downloaded as required); applicable news media. Analysis of identity documents: CPC-Vegreville Strategic Analysis Reports; • CPIC Query; • Verification of supporting documents: driver's licences; social insurance cards; notarized documents; police certificates/criminal background checks; marriage and divorce certificates; tax records (Note: Notices of Assessment issued by the Canada Revenue Agency are a common supporting document. The Income Tax Act precludes release to a third party without client consent); bank records, financial statements. (Note: Fraudulent financial records may be an attempt to misrepresent identity in order to conceal embezzlement, fraud, stock market tampering or other white collar crime.) property deeds; business licenses, share certificates, or proof of owned assets; educational credentials: diplomas, graduation certificates, transcripts; letters of acceptance or transcripts from post-secondary institutions in Canada; invitation letters; offers of employment current employment references and past employment history. • telephone calls to all contacts on application, acceptance letters, employment offer, references, etc. • site visits (visa offices, case specific). consultations with partners and other governments; • inquiries into documents: are the documents originals or certified true copies? what is the quality of the originals? Where appropriate, offices may seek to obtain sample original documents from the issuing authority for comparison purposes. In Canada, inland officers may consult with the fraudulent documents specialists in the CBSA Intelligence Offices. • Verification of financial statements:
Misrepresentation and inadmissibility
Where the application of anti-fraud verification procedures discovers misrepresentation or the withholding of material facts, the applicant may become inadmissible by virtue of A40, their application is, or may be, refused, and an A44 report may be prepared. However, this is not automatic as there may be situations where there was no deliberate attempt to mislead and where an oversight or lack of understanding resulted in missing or conflicting information.
http://www.ci.gc.ca/Manuals/index_e.asp
Referral to the CBSA
If quality-assurance exercises, first-level verifications, and interviews have not addressed all fraud concerns, a referral to the CBSA for enhanced checks or investigation may be warranted. Processing of some outside-Canada cases or cases at the inland CIC or CPC will require enhanced verification by the in-Canada CBSA regional intelligence or enforcement units or at visa offices by MIOs.
It must be understood that a request for a fraud investigation could add considerable time to the processing of an application. CIC officers should therefore carefully consider whether they do have sufficient information to warrant a refusal and whether the results of a further investigation will add significantly more value or weight to their decision. Before referring a case to the CBSA for further fraud investigation, officers are asked to consider the following:
• Is there sufficient information to justify refusal? If so, the expenditure of resources required for further verification may not be warranted.
• Have all possible first-level verifications been completed?
• Is there a need for a consultation with the CBSA prior to referral?
• Is there evidence to suggest that there may be organized fraud?
• Is there information involved in this application that may have intelligence value, i.e., does it contain an example or technique that should be shared with other offices?
• Is there a need to consult with law enforcement agencies or other sources not available to CIC?
In forwarding a request to the CBSA for a second-level verification, the request must be specific about the areas of concern and the verifications already undertaken.
Alternatively, officers or program managers may want to refer the cases of clients, consultants or other third parties of interest to the attention of the CBSA where there is some suspicion that an organized fraud is being perpetrated. Upon referral of concerns from CIC, the CBSA will conduct further verifications as required to provide trend reports or other indicators to CIC as an aid in future screening of related cases. Ultimately, a CBSA investigation into an organized fraud may result in a request for a criminal investigation.
Conducting second-level verifications
This section covers general activities that comprise the main broad elements that would be undertaken in any second-level anti-fraud investigation. A variety of these procedures would apply to each of the business lines where the CBSA could be asked to pursue a second-level fraud investigation. The reader will note some overlap with first-level verifications.
The kinds of activities generally done in second-level anti-fraud investigations include: • Analysis of FOSS client history and the histories of related FOSS clients, including: relatives; persons who are part of a group whose members may have been refused a visa or did not comply with conditions on a previous visit; previous travel/visa/application history - what was the basis of past visa issuance/refusal decisions? Are there contradictions or obvious inconsistencies in the recent application? • Analysis of cases within the CIC inventory: fraud trends and patterns; or identification of other anti-fraud indicators; or identification of third-party accomplices. • Background checks on systems accessible to the CBSA, as applicable: CBSA Intranet site; Secure Tracking System (STS); Support System for Intelligence (SSI); regional intelligence databases; Immigration Medical System (IMS). • Detailed document analysis by trained, experienced document examiners; • Background and/or CPIC checks on contacts in Canada, including: employers;
Internet search engines, such as Google, to research names, businesses, references; whitepages.com, 411.ca, etc – to verify phone numbers to see if there is an associated address, name, or listing; LEXIS/NEXIS (a commercial electronic research database accessed by subscription over the internet. Using assigned passwords, users can access the new portion of this service where archived articles from newspapers, magazines and journals are available to be word-searched and downloaded as required); applicable news media. Analysis of identity documents: CPC-Vegreville Strategic Analysis Reports; • CPIC Query; • Verification of supporting documents: driver's licences; social insurance cards; notarized documents; police certificates/criminal background checks; marriage and divorce certificates; tax records (Note: Notices of Assessment issued by the Canada Revenue Agency are a common supporting document. The Income Tax Act precludes release to a third party without client consent); bank records, financial statements. (Note: Fraudulent financial records may be an attempt to misrepresent identity in order to conceal embezzlement, fraud, stock market tampering or other white collar crime.) property deeds; business licenses, share certificates, or proof of owned assets; educational credentials: diplomas, graduation certificates, transcripts; letters of acceptance or transcripts from post-secondary institutions in Canada; invitation letters; offers of employment current employment references and past employment history. • telephone calls to all contacts on application, acceptance letters, employment offer, references, etc. • site visits (visa offices, case specific). consultations with partners and other governments; • inquiries into documents: are the documents originals or certified true copies? what is the quality of the originals? Where appropriate, offices may seek to obtain sample original documents from the issuing authority for comparison purposes. In Canada, inland officers may consult with the fraudulent documents specialists in the CBSA Intelligence Offices. • Verification of financial statements:Misrepresentation and inadmissibility
Where the application of anti-fraud verification procedures discovers misrepresentation or the withholding of material facts, the applicant may become inadmissible by virtue of A40, their application is, or may be, refused, and an A44 report may be prepared. However, this is not automatic as there may be situations where there was no deliberate attempt to mislead and where an oversight or lack of understanding resulted in missing or conflicting information.
http://www.ci.gc.ca/Manuals/index_e.asp
Referral to the CBSA
If quality-assurance exercises, first-level verifications, and interviews have not addressed all fraud concerns, a referral to the CBSA for enhanced checks or investigation may be warranted. Processing of some outside-Canada cases or cases at the inland CIC or CPC will require enhanced verification by the in-Canada CBSA regional intelligence or enforcement units or at visa offices by MIOs.
It must be understood that a request for a fraud investigation could add considerable time to the processing of an application. CIC officers should therefore carefully consider whether they do have sufficient information to warrant a refusal and whether the results of a further investigation will add significantly more value or weight to their decision. Before referring a case to the CBSA for further fraud investigation, officers are asked to consider the following:
• Is there sufficient information to justify refusal? If so, the expenditure of resources required for further verification may not be warranted.
• Have all possible first-level verifications been completed?
• Is there a need for a consultation with the CBSA prior to referral?
• Is there evidence to suggest that there may be organized fraud?
• Is there information involved in this application that may have intelligence value, i.e., does it contain an example or technique that should be shared with other offices?
• Is there a need to consult with law enforcement agencies or other sources not available to CIC?
In forwarding a request to the CBSA for a second-level verification, the request must be specific about the areas of concern and the verifications already undertaken.
Alternatively, officers or program managers may want to refer the cases of clients, consultants or other third parties of interest to the attention of the CBSA where there is some suspicion that an organized fraud is being perpetrated. Upon referral of concerns from CIC, the CBSA will conduct further verifications as required to provide trend reports or other indicators to CIC as an aid in future screening of related cases. Ultimately, a CBSA investigation into an organized fraud may result in a request for a criminal investigation.
Conducting second-level verifications
This section covers general activities that comprise the main broad elements that would be undertaken in any second-level anti-fraud investigation. A variety of these procedures would apply to each of the business lines where the CBSA could be asked to pursue a second-level fraud investigation. The reader will note some overlap with first-level verifications.
The kinds of activities generally done in second-level anti-fraud investigations include: • Analysis of FOSS client history and the histories of related FOSS clients, including:
relatives; persons who are part of a group whose members may have been refused a visa or did not comply with conditions on a previous visit; previous travel/visa/application history - what was the basis of past visa issuance/refusal decisions? Are there contradictions or obvious inconsistencies in the recent application? • Analysis of cases within the CIC inventory: fraud trends and patterns; or identification of other anti-fraud indicators; or identification of third-party accomplices. • Background checks on systems accessible to the CBSA, as applicable: CBSA Intranet site; Secure Tracking System (STS); Support System for Intelligence (SSI); regional intelligence databases; Immigration Medical System (IMS). • Detailed document analysis by trained, experienced document examiners; • Background and/or CPIC checks on contacts in Canada, including: employers;
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spouses; owners of employment agencies. • Checks with law enforcement partnersDisclosure of CBSA investigations to CIC
In order to continue the close partnership that CIC and the CBSA have in combatting fraud, it is essential that the relevant findings and reports of each organization related to quality-assurance exercises and anti-fraud investigations are routinely shared. In so doing, both organizations need to be mindful of the fact that reports in the area of fraud can be of significant intelligence value for those whose intention is to commit fraud in order to gain or maintain immigration status for non-genuine, inadmissible, or improperly documented individuals. To this effect, any documents that may include information on particular investigative methods and techniques, informants who have provided tips on fraud, screening questions, or on-going law-enforcement investigations must be properly classified and exempted from access.
In addition, special consideration needs to be given to the classification and exemption of information regarding the content of site-visit requests or other investigative requests made by CIC to the CBSA. In many cases, the content of these requests in domestic or international data repositories (such as FOSS or CAIPS) should not automatically be included in the client record nor should they be automatically disclosed.
NOTE: There is NO evidence to suggest that CBSA/IRCC COORDINATION TO DETECT FRAUD IS PART OF SS. BUT BOTH OF THESE AGENCIES CAN VERIFY LITERALLY EVERYTHING WE HAVE PROVIDED WHILE PASSING ELIGIBILITY OR SECURITY SCREENING. BUT IF THEY WANT TO DO IT, THEY CAN AND THEY WILL INVOLVE LIAISON OFFICES THAT ARE POSTED WITHIN APPLICANTS HOME COUNTRYS' CANADIAN MISSION/EMBASSY/CONSULATE.
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They also have a mandate to do ss for certain nationalitis from high risk countries.
Disclosure of CBSA investigations to CIC
In order to continue the close partnership that CIC and the CBSA have in combatting fraud, it is essential that the relevant findings and reports of each organization related to quality-assurance exercises and anti-fraud investigations are routinely shared. In so doing, both organizations need to be mindful of the fact that reports in the area of fraud can be of significant intelligence value for those whose intention is to commit fraud in order to gain or maintain immigration status for non-genuine, inadmissible, or improperly documented individuals. To this effect, any documents that may include information on particular investigative methods and techniques, informants who have provided tips on fraud, screening questions, or on-going law-enforcement investigations must be properly classified and exempted from access.
In addition, special consideration needs to be given to the classification and exemption of information regarding the content of site-visit requests or other investigative requests made by CIC to the CBSA. In many cases, the content of these requests in domestic or international data repositories (such as FOSS or CAIPS) should not automatically be included in the client record nor should they be automatically disclosed.
NOTE: There is NO evidence to suggest that CBSA/IRCC COORDINATION TO DETECT FRAUD IS PART OF SS. BUT BOTH OF THESE AGENCIES CAN VERIFY LITERALLY EVERYTHING WE HAVE PROVIDED WHILE PASSING ELIGIBILITY OR SECURITY SCREENING. BUT IF THEY WANT TO DO IT, THEY CAN AND THEY WILL INVOLVE LIAISON OFFICES THAT ARE POSTED WITHIN APPLICANTS HOME COUNTRYS' CANADIAN MISSION/EMBASSY/CONSULATE.
They have a mandate to do everything regardless of the high risk low risk factor
Hello guys,
As I posted on the other day, I got a reply from CSIS stating that my SS is done in DEC 2016.
I also received a letter from CBSA today returning to my request in regards to 'Information and status of security screening for PR application pertaining to ___(my name)'.
The letter says;
Request disposition - does not exist
Comments - you may wish to seek this information from IRCC/CSIS. Although we may be implicated in the final security decision somewhere down the line, CBS does not currently hold records relevant to your request.
So here's my question,
Did I request to the wrong agency? Or does this mean I didn't go through CBSA?
I'm confused what this letter implies...
Cuz apparently CSIS letter says their role is 'to provide advice to IRCC through the CBSA'.
As I posted on the other day, I got a reply from CSIS stating that my SS is done in DEC 2016.
I also received a letter from CBSA today returning to my request in regards to 'Information and status of security screening for PR application pertaining to ___(my name)'.
The letter says;
Request disposition - does not exist
Comments - you may wish to seek this information from IRCC/CSIS. Although we may be implicated in the final security decision somewhere down the line, CBS does not currently hold records relevant to your request.
So here's my question,
Did I request to the wrong agency? Or does this mean I didn't go through CBSA?
I'm confused what this letter implies...
Cuz apparently CSIS letter says their role is 'to provide advice to IRCC through the CBSA'.
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Hi did you get gcms and was showing you you are security screening or just guessing?
Dear friends
It's been 8 months since I got aor.
I ordered 2 gcms notes and my eligibility is still recommended pass by case analyst. There is nothing mention about officer comment.
My background check is NA since last 6 months. I don't know why it's taking too long to pass my eligibility?
Does anybody have background status NA for more than 6 months ???
It's been 8 months since I got aor.
I ordered 2 gcms notes and my eligibility is still recommended pass by case analyst. There is nothing mention about officer comment.
My background check is NA since last 6 months. I don't know why it's taking too long to pass my eligibility?
Does anybody have background status NA for more than 6 months ???
It's been exactly 6 months since my AOR. My BG check is NA since last 4 months. In my first GCMS notes, eligibility is review required and analyst has recommended pass. My 2nd GCMS notes hasn't come yet. Even it gets delayed. Can you believe it? When I call or mail the CIC guys, there is only standard reply that everything is under review. I don't understand what's taking them so much time. Iam so fed up with this. I just want to know the decision. But have no clue. What help I can get? Or what steps should I take to let them speed up the process.
I sent a fax to CSIS and received a letter that confirmed my security screening in CSI. Also, you may find some words in GCMS that show your security screening has been started.