.
Reference and link are appreciated.
As one might expect from cessation cases in recent years, there is little news in Yilmaz v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 625, which is here:
https://canlii.ca/t/kkzpx
In this regard it is much like other decisions during the last few years, since numerous Federal Court decisions issued in the wake of the Federal Court of Appeal decision in the
Camayo case (March 2022) have more or less illustrated that the FCs would nonetheless continue to lean toward upholding the RPD's conclusions in regards to the voluntariness and intent elements in cessation cases that are based on reavailment involving travel to the home country. There have been some exceptions, but none suggesting anything other than there is a high risk that travel to the home country will lead to cessation no matter how compelling the reasons for the travel are.
That is, for a PR-refugee considering travel to the home country, so assessing the risks, they should be aware that their personal reasons for the travel, no matter how compelling, may not reduce the risks much if at all. What matters most, and most by a big, big margin, is the inherent decision underlying the act of entering the home country using a travel document issued by the home country. Why does not matter much.
It is worth repeating, this case is consistent with most cases, before and after
Camayo. But, for clarification,
in regards to the observation that the
*why* for the trip does not matter much, this is despite the FCA decision in Camayo, and would be contrary to Camayo except Camayo allows wide decision making discretion so long as the RPD "
engages" with the facts raised by a PR-refugee as to the issues of voluntariness of the travel and the intent to reavail.
There has been a lot of what, more or less, amounts to "
yeah, this and that considered, but the travel was voluntary, and the presumption of intent to reavail has not been rebutted."
There are exceptions.
One of the exceptions is the previous case discussed here:
Ahmad v. Canada, 2026 FC 227, which was discussed here back at the end of February. As I previously noted (last August), despite my effort to review almost every published cessation decision by the Federal Court for more than a decade, I had "
. . . personally grown lax watching for new cessation cases." Meanwhile, it was highly likely there have been other Federal Court cessation decisions since then, since
Ahmad and before
Yilmaz.
And yes, there are additional cases not mentioned or discussed here. Including the big one:
the Slepcsik constitutional challenge that more than a few had pinned their hopes to. This warrants further discussion, but for now those hopes depend on a further appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.
Spoiler alert: Justice Gleeson rejects the constitutional challenges, and this includes validating the automatic termination of PR status as a consequence when refugee status is ceased. The
Slepcsik decision is a long one and as weedy as it gets (to be expected in constitutional cases). Questions were certified, so this could be on its way to the FCA, assuming timing limitations have been met . . . the Slepcsik decision was actually made last November . . . no mention here til now, illustrating . . . well, the obvious.
Meanwhile, my sense is that most cases continue to parallel
Yilmaz more than
Ahmad (and it is not here known yet whether Ahmad has or will escape cessation, just that it has been at least postponed), and that means that reason enough to go is reason enough to gamble PR status, to put it all on the line, to "
bet the ranch" some say, a bet that to some extent relies on stranger bureaucrats accepting there was no choice at all, that it was involuntary. Best that goes, it tends to get tricky; odds do not appear to be good.
That is, for PR-refugees, do not go home unless it's for a reason that is more important than keeping Canadian PR status.
Unfair as that sounds, and really is in many cases, exceedingly harsh in too many cases, that appears to be the practical reality.
Do not go home unless going is more important than keeping Canadian PR status.
That's not Camayo. Relying on what's arguable based on Camayo is risky, highly risky.
This deserves more attention, particularly given the other recent cessation decisions that have not been discussed here (I will get to them, but this is not an off-the-cuff subject, takes some research, reading, digesting, and rumination, all taking time). This includes a couple decisions by Justice Turley setting aside cessation, which some might think offers some promise if relying on what's arguable based on Camayo. I will try to explain why it is not a good idea for PR-refugees deciding if or when to return to their home country, but the gist of it is that what is arguable based on Camayo is about what might work to save status when the government has decided to impose cessation, and it very much appears the odds are not good.
In regards to Yilmaz in particular . . .
This one feels pretty outrageous to me.
To the extent this is oriented to how unfair or unjust it is to strip a PR-refugee of their status to remain in Canada, based on a
presumption of reavailment intent, that aligns with my personal sentiments. Which is mostly about what the law should be, about what should happen if the law was fair and just.
In regards to how the current law regarding cessation works, what the criteria is and how decision-making standards apply, Justice Grammond's decision mostly stays within the lines and is consistent with most other FC decisions addressing cessation based on reavailment . . .
. . . except? Well, yeah, there is a "
no 'elephant in the room'" elephant in the room.
I will try to address this further, but first there are several other cessation and cessation-related decisions to catch-up with.
