2023 Citizenship Applications
- Thread starter GFLiam
- Start date
Update today. Oath schedule September 22
Congrats! Happy for you.
Good to see that IRCC is very quick at wrapping up things once CSIS is done sleeping on applications.
Thanks for your long paragraphs. Yet, I think the reasons you highlighted are just as speculative as things we read in articles. There's absolutely no transparency to the public on what IRCC or CSIS does when they receive an application or a referral, and worse what would even trigger an investigation. I am not going to go into details, but everyone that I know, close family/friends to just casual friends were all shocked why would my case be on hold for investigation. I believe there's a big mistake and mix up somewhere, but unless IRCC (or CSIS, who the heck knows honestly) opens up to me about it, I can't help to resolve it.
I've been saying all along that a 3rd party needs to provide an ombudsperson service to help resolve these hold ups. I really believe a majority of these investigation cases are not even worth anyone's time and taxpayer's money, but IRCC is just stuck in their own ways.
Have you used mp channel to find out why the investigation? Plus pushing for better timeline
Do u happen to know that after bcg clearance, what is your status changed to grant clearance pending
So complete silence since BG got updated on June 19. I ended up filing application record on July 11 and was under impression that DOJ has 30 days to respond to AR. Its been almost 2 months and I am yet to get any response from DOJ/IRCC. My lawyer told me that FC has likely granted more time to DOJ to respond due to backlog but it makes no sense to me that the other party (me) is not informed of the extension even if it is granted. Lawyer has no reply and claims he can’t check so we have to wait.So I had an update today. Background has turned green/complete on June 19. Prohibitions still pending.
Is there another long waiting period… we shall find out
It seems entire system is effed and spending money on mandamus just adds insult to injury.
FWIW . . . I have not tried to ascertain, let alone analyze or discuss the what or why in your particular case. Generally, in regards to what's happening in a particular case, I don't go there beyond what is more or less obvious, and particularly not into matters best sorted out in private, in confidence, with the help of a lawyer (if and when things get to a stage in which waiting is not the solution). After all, getting stuck in an in-depth or comprehensive security screening (beyond the standard clearances that ALL applicants must get), one that is delaying a citizenship application for an inordinate period of time, is a serious matter . . . many if not most applicants in this situation would be wise to recognize that more than their citizenship application could be at stake, so it may be prudent to see a lawyer not for mandamus but to better protect themselves . . . but some, others, wrestling with what to do next to get a fair resolution.
In any event it appears you quoted the wrong post or did not read the post you quoted. You state:
"I think the reasons you highlighted are just as speculative as things we read in articles."
But my post, the one quoted, does not state "reasons" for . . . well, anything. Let alone any reasons that are "highlighted." There are two parts to the post you quote.
One part addresses the lack of useful information in a media news article, and while that may have contained some speculative statements that you are referring to, my comments were about the extent to which the article conflates and confuses more than it illuminates. I suppose one could say (speculate) that the reporting about Abuhannoud feeling like he is being punished based on where he comes from is "speculative" in regards to why he is being punished. But that is his speculation, not mine; I did not and still do not suggest a reason why Abuhannoud's application is delayed; I do not speculate why his case is tangled in security screening.
Perhaps you meant a word other than "speculative" but I won't speculate what that might be. And perhaps it was some other statements in my post, other than "reasons," you were referring to as "highlighted" and "speculative" reasons. Leading to the second part of the post.
The second part of the post was to verify what you posted, that CSIS can and almost certainly does access social media when conducting background screening, and to illustrate this should be NO surprise, no surprise at all, and to illustrate with real examples that not just CSIS but IRCC itself will consider information found in social media.
To be clear, even though my recall of the particular details is a bit rusty, the examples I describe to illustrate IRCC using social media and other open sources to find information about applicants, and use it against them, are not at all speculative (in case that is what you were saying is speculative). These examples are from officially published decisions of actual cases, factual considerations cited as explanations for the decisions in those cases as stated by the respective decision-makers (Federal Court justices reviewing citizenship cases; IAD panel determining an allegation of misrepresentation in inadmissibility proceedings); that is, what I described is what those decision-makers stated to support their respective decisions about real people in actual cases (noting I described these cases far better and in more detail, together with citation and link to the published decisions, back in the posts where I previously discussed these cases and the scope of open source screening).
Meanwhile, we (some of us anyway) know a lot about how things actually work. Claims there is no transparency in the processing of citizenship applications are at the very least grossly exaggerated, but mostly just NOT true.
Sure, we do not know how some things work. Some of the process is behind a confidentiality curtain. And in individual cases, some of the details are confidential and not disclosed to the applicant despite it being personal information regarding the applicant.
One thing that we know very well, no speculation necessary, is that if an applicant's credibility is compromised, that very much increases the risk of a lengthy investigation. So, going back to the LinkedIn stuff, applicants should be aware that IRCC, and CBSA, NSSD, and CSIS, all can and sometimes will compare information in applications with other information posted or shared by the applicant, or posted about the applicant (yeah, what others post about you on the internet can be and sometimes will be considered as well; but hopefully this is used cautiously, with due consideration for the source -- note, for example, that IRCC/CIC gave the individual an opportunity to respond to information it had found about the applicant having a speaker's role at a conference in Europe during a time the applicant reported being in Canada). And no one will be the least surprised that discrepancies in the information can compromise the applicant's credibility, ranging from making things a little more difficult to causing serious problems . . . DEPENDING . . . depending a lot on the individual case, the specific details, the nature and extent of the discrepancies for example, and of course allowing for some influence based on general criteria (like country of origin).
Anyway, the following is not true:
"There's absolutely no transparency to the public on what IRCC or CSIS does when they receive an application or a referral, and worse what would even trigger an investigation."
As noted, the following is not true:
There are problems with the extent to which certain aspects of processing citizenship applications are confidential, as well as some in regards to instances or circumstances in which a person has limited access to personal information affecting their application. And I certainly do not mean to be insensitive to those who are unfairly affected. But the process is mostly transparent, highly transparent.
In regards to the CSIS security side of things in particular (it being a near blackhole), it is important to recognize that what CSIS does is kept behind a wall in which the Canadian government is not going to be installing any windows anytime soon. Those waiting for those curtains to open will be disappointed. That information is not getting out.
So improving how the system works (or to put it another way, to further reduce the number of citizenship applicants forced to wait excessively long and inordinate timelines), demands a procedural remedy . . . and there will be no progress in advancing this cause without clearly focusing on the particular context and procedures involved in the particular cases affected rather than chase the distraction of overbroad rants. The latter is distraction.
To be clear, the lack of access to particular information in an individual case can be unfair and unjust notwithstanding a great deal of transparency in the process. Contrary to your claim (an untrue claim) that there is "no" transparency, asserting that there is "absolutely no transparency" no less, there is actually an extensive amount of transparency, including transparency about what IRCC does when they receive an application. The problem is NOT that there is no transparency, but rather that there are flaws in the process including gaps in transparency, and those who are genuinely, sincerely interested not merely in addressing the problem in their own case (for which they should retain legal counsel -- cannot emphasize this enough, some cases demand a lawyer's assistance, which is to say in these situations this forum will not have answers, not real answers anyway, so of course I do not have answers for a particular individual in their own case), but those advocating for improvements will do better to focus on identifying what in particular is problematic and how to address that, rather than flinging hyperbolic accusations in overbroad rants that actually obscure more than they illuminate. But yeah, doing the homework and figuring things out, not popular these days. Yeah, many find whole sentences, let alone paragraphs, too much to read (which does not seem to abate their claims to know better than what they have not and will not bother to read).
To be clear, just the governing statutory provisions and regulations, all of which are quite easily accessed by the public, provide a great deal of transparency into both procedural and substantive aspects of processing citizenship applications. In particular:
Charter, Citizenship Act, IRPA, and respective regulations:
There are problems with the extent to which certain aspects of processing citizenship applications are confidential, as well as some in regards to instances or circumstances in which a person has limited access to personal information affecting their application. And I certainly do not mean to be insensitive to those who are unfairly affected. But the process is mostly transparent, highly transparent.
In regards to the CSIS security side of things in particular (it being a near blackhole), it is important to recognize that what CSIS does is kept behind a wall in which the Canadian government is not going to be installing any windows anytime soon. Those waiting for those curtains to open will be disappointed. That information is not getting out.
So improving how the system works (or to put it another way, to further reduce the number of citizenship applicants forced to wait excessively long and inordinate timelines), demands a procedural remedy . . . and there will be no progress in advancing this cause without clearly focusing on the particular context and procedures involved in the particular cases affected rather than chase the distraction of overbroad rants. The latter is distraction.
To be clear, the lack of access to particular information in an individual case can be unfair and unjust notwithstanding a great deal of transparency in the process. Contrary to your claim (an untrue claim) that there is "no" transparency, asserting that there is "absolutely no transparency" no less, there is actually an extensive amount of transparency, including transparency about what IRCC does when they receive an application. The problem is NOT that there is no transparency, but rather that there are flaws in the process including gaps in transparency, and those who are genuinely, sincerely interested not merely in addressing the problem in their own case (for which they should retain legal counsel -- cannot emphasize this enough, some cases demand a lawyer's assistance, which is to say in these situations this forum will not have answers, not real answers anyway, so of course I do not have answers for a particular individual in their own case), but those advocating for improvements will do better to focus on identifying what in particular is problematic and how to address that, rather than flinging hyperbolic accusations in overbroad rants that actually obscure more than they illuminate. But yeah, doing the homework and figuring things out, not popular these days. Yeah, many find whole sentences, let alone paragraphs, too much to read (which does not seem to abate their claims to know better than what they have not and will not bother to read).
To be clear, just the governing statutory provisions and regulations, all of which are quite easily accessed by the public, provide a great deal of transparency into both procedural and substantive aspects of processing citizenship applications. In particular:
Charter, Citizenship Act, IRPA, and respective regulations:
Unlike too many nations, but more in line with other more progressive countries (Canada clearly among the most progressive) that follow and apply the rule of law and principles of justice, fairness generally, due process and procedural fairness particularly, as well equal protection under the law and equal application of the law, Canada publicly shares in readily accessible formats all its governing laws and regulations, in the Charter, Citizenship Act, IRPA, Citizenship Regulations, and Immigration regulations, and openly publishes information about proposed changes to the law and regulations in the Gazette.
This is no little let alone trite thing. The Citizenship Act clearly specifies the prohibitions which preclude eligibility for citizenship, so there is plenty of information about what can trigger investigatory processing (and of course the Criminal Code lays out much more detail about what in particular can be the focus of investigation); IRPA lays out the various reasons why a PR (applying for citizenship or otherwise) would be inadmissible, so here too there is plenty of information about the sorts of things that can trigger investigatory processing, including matters related to public safety and security in general that can be referred to CBSA and its NSSD for investigation, as well as more particular types of security concerns that can trigger a referral to CSIS (beyond the standard/routine "clearances").
Further observations in regards to the untrue claim:
For clarity, and in anticipation of the BS (not a lot of BS, since soundbite BS is more likely) here are some additional references (just a sampling) to an extensive amount of transparency in what IRCC does when they receive an application:
All that is just scratching the surface. Also see scores of datasets (maintained by Canada and publicly accessible) that contain relevant information, including those focused on AI tools such as algorithmic analysis (there is a high probability these tools are generating a lot of the more recent security risks referrals) as well as, just one example, datasets containing statistics for CSIS immigration and citizenship screening programs (which show that the majority of all such screening program requests are for citizenship applications, noting that this does not differentiate between the standard (perfunctory) CSIS clearance for ALL applicants, which are done in large batches, from those individual screening requests/referrals affecting a quite small percentage of citizenship applicants). And there are scores and scores of completed ATI requests which anyone can get a copy of that contain a massive amount of relevant information (but sure, digging into these is hard time-consuming work, and demands a lot of dedicated preparation work in order to navigate, sort, and understand the information).
Some Speculation: Probably safe to bet that the number who continue to overstate the untrue claim that there is "no" transparency will be far, far larger than the number who bother to read (let alone study) one-tenth of the information available about how the process actually works. TLTR tends to override getting informed.
Practical Reality, No Speculation Necessary: Unless family, friends, and colleagues are trained professionals with experience in immigration and citizenship cases involving complex background screening, and know the applicant's personal details in depth to an extent best kept within the confidential confines of an attorney-client relationship, hard to see how they can reliably conclude much at all about the what or why behind comprehensive security screening in a particular case.
Main thing is get informed enough to figure out (as best one can) if and when it is time to get help from a lawyer . . . and again, to not lose sight of the potential seriousness underlying such elevated scrutiny, to stay aware this could signal a situation in which it would be wise to obtain a lawyer's assistance to defend oneself. More than just the citizenship application could be at stake.
For clarity, and in anticipation of the BS (not a lot of BS, since soundbite BS is more likely) here are some additional references (just a sampling) to an extensive amount of transparency in what IRCC does when they receive an application:
Operational instructions and guidelines:
From PDIs like "Accepting applications" and other information IRCC publicly posts online, such as the information found in dozens (literally dozens) of other sources of information cited and linked in a "Citizenship Program Overview," and in the many links in the linked sources, there is literally a massive amount of information about what IRCC does when they receive a citizenship application.
Published Federal Court decisions:
There are many decisions published by the Federal Court (see here or here and do a little homework) describing actual cases in detail, often a lot of detail, including scores of cases in which citizenship applicants were seeking Mandamus, many of which involve applications stuck in process for many years (quite a few in the five to ten year range, some approaching two decades), in which the court discusses many details in how the process worked in the particular case, what triggered concerns, what led to suspended processing, what the parameters are and how they are applied. This too is no little thing. For those willing to do the homework, there's a lot that can be learned about things like what increases the risk of elevated scrutiny, what increases the risk of an investigatory referral to CBSA/NSSD or CSIS, and some insight into the procedures. Very little is redacted (in most decisions nothing is redacted).
Applying this information in the specific individual's case is not easy, not easy in figuring out what is happening, and not easy in terms of figuring out what can be done about it. In the abstract figuring this stuff out would be highly speculative. But applicants know their own facts and history, and this information can help most (not all) applicants get a better idea, a more concrete appraisal of what might be involved in their own case . . . notwithstanding some uncertainty that remains, for most this should be enough to help them decide if and when to get a lawyer involved, and with the lawyer's assistance figure out if and when to pursue litigation (such as mandamus) . . . and again, many of those tangled in more serious security background screening would be wise to consider when to obtain legal counsel because more than the citizenship application could be in jeopardy.
Particular PDIs about investigations, suspending applications, and related information:
In addition to the law, regulations, and case decisions, there are PDIs and other sources containing an extensive amount of information regarding who, what, when, and why a PR (whether or not an applicant for citizenship) could be tangled in an investigation for inadmissibility and related prohibitions, including PDIs like the one titled "Procedure: Suspending applications," to operational manuals ranging from ENF1 Inadmissibility (covering what constitutes inadmissibility including inadmissibility based on security related grounds) to particular information like an entire operational manual, ENF18 Human or international rights violations (going into detail about establishing inadmissibility for crimes against humanity or war crimes), as well as, just as an example, IP 10 Refusal of National Security Cases/Processing of National Interest Requests (even though this is specifically for processing PR applications, so is about Foreign Nationals not Canadians who have PR status, it provides useful context and comparable processing for situations in which there are national security concerns) or, again just an example, OP 21 and OP 22 dealing with appeals and judicial review (these are specifically about decisions made in overseas visa offices so not directly about processing citizenship applications, but here too the information provides context and comparable processing that can be helpful in better understanding internal policy, practice, and procedure).
I have not had time to fully digest some of the information shared by CBSA this summer, in July, so I cannot say to what extent it directly reveals investigation processing information about citizenship applicants, but for an illustration of the kind of information, transparency in operations, that CBSA (for example) is regularly sharing with the public in regards to its role, and the role of NSSD in particular, in regards to security screening, see (again, these are merely examples of a lot more that is available):
Evaluation of the Immigration National Security Screening Program: Achievement of program objectives
All that is just scratching the surface. Also see scores of datasets (maintained by Canada and publicly accessible) that contain relevant information, including those focused on AI tools such as algorithmic analysis (there is a high probability these tools are generating a lot of the more recent security risks referrals) as well as, just one example, datasets containing statistics for CSIS immigration and citizenship screening programs (which show that the majority of all such screening program requests are for citizenship applications, noting that this does not differentiate between the standard (perfunctory) CSIS clearance for ALL applicants, which are done in large batches, from those individual screening requests/referrals affecting a quite small percentage of citizenship applicants). And there are scores and scores of completed ATI requests which anyone can get a copy of that contain a massive amount of relevant information (but sure, digging into these is hard time-consuming work, and demands a lot of dedicated preparation work in order to navigate, sort, and understand the information).
Some Speculation: Probably safe to bet that the number who continue to overstate the untrue claim that there is "no" transparency will be far, far larger than the number who bother to read (let alone study) one-tenth of the information available about how the process actually works. TLTR tends to override getting informed.
Practical Reality, No Speculation Necessary: Unless family, friends, and colleagues are trained professionals with experience in immigration and citizenship cases involving complex background screening, and know the applicant's personal details in depth to an extent best kept within the confidential confines of an attorney-client relationship, hard to see how they can reliably conclude much at all about the what or why behind comprehensive security screening in a particular case.
Main thing is get informed enough to figure out (as best one can) if and when it is time to get help from a lawyer . . . and again, to not lose sight of the potential seriousness underlying such elevated scrutiny, to stay aware this could signal a situation in which it would be wise to obtain a lawyer's assistance to defend oneself. More than just the citizenship application could be at stake.
AOR July 2023, finally Background is complete. Pending Prohibitions and Physical Presence.
